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14 JANUARY 1988



JPRS Report



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Renewed Cruise Testing Protested

Peace Activists

52200006 Windsor *THE WINDSOR STAR* in English
26 Oct 87 p A 9

[Text] Edmonton (CP)—Peace activists are livid over Tuesday's planned U.S. cruise missile test over northern Canada—the first such test since a tentative superpower arms-limitation pact was reached last month.

"I think it's more than an insult, but I don't have the word for it," said Harry Stryndaka, spokesman for the Alberta Citizens' Anti-Cruise Committee, a coalition of church and labor groups.

"That agreement has just about reached its final stages and here we are going ahead with testing of the cruise in Canada," said Stryndaka, adding his group plans a noon protest at the Alberta legislature on the test day.

The United States and Soviet Union agreed in principal last month to remove all medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe. The pact has yet to be ratified.

Tuesday's flight is the ninth over Canadian soil under a 1983 Canada-U.S. agreement. The tests are held over Canada because the terrain is similar to that in the Soviet Union.

THE MISSILE will be flown from the Beaufort Sea to the Primrose Lake weapons range near Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake attached to a B-52 jet bomber.

The "captive-carry" flight is similar to other tests of the cruise-missile guidance system carried out in January 1985 and March 1984, said base spokesman Maj. Jan Martinsen.

Although the Vancouver-based environmental group Greenpeace said it believes the missile to be tested is a top-secret Stealth weapon capable of higher speeds and avoiding radar detection, Martinsen said it is the same model previously tested.

Greenpeace was "caught by surprise" and will not send any protesters to Cold Lake, said one spokesman, Bev Pinnegar.

The unexpected announcement violates the terms of another Canada-U.S. testing agreement struck in December 1985, Greenpeace charged in a statement issued Sunday.

"THE 1985 Canada-U.S. cruise test agreement clearly states that "missile launch dates will be confined to the first quarter of the year," said Steve Shallhorn, Greenpeace disarmament co-ordinator, in Toronto.

Shallhorn accused the federal government of signing a new secret deal with the Americans for a test to be going on this time of year.

"It's outrageous that Canada is expanding its cruise missile test program, even as an arms-control agreement is about to be signed," he said.

"It seems that the United States wants to slip in as much testing as possible before public pressure mounts to cancel the tests altogether."

"Even the Liberals, who initiated the tests, are now opposed to them," he added.

The test—the last of the year, Martinsen said—is set to begin between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. and the bomber will return to Fairchild Air Force Base in Spokane, Wash., after completing the 2,200-km route.

The bomber and its cargo will fly along the eastern portion of the normal test route which begins at the Beaufort Sea, follows the MacKenzie River south, then turns before heading toward the Primrose Lake range on the Alberta-Saskatchewan border.

Opposition MP's

52200006 Toronto *THE GLOBE AND MAIL* in English
27 Oct 87 p A 5

[Text] Today's test of a cruise missile over Canada shows that the federal government is kowtowing to U.S. military interests, not just backing NATO, opposition MPs said yesterday.

They urged the Government to stop tests of the air-launched version of the weapon now that the United States and the Soviet Union are near an agreement on a plan to eliminate medium and short-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The opposition said the former Liberal Government agreed to the tests in 1983 based on a decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe to counter a Soviet buildup of so-called intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Since the superpowers are near agreement on INF weapons in Europe, the cruise tests have lost their justification, said William Blaikie, external affairs critic for the New Democratic Party.

Mr. Blaikie said the Government has abandoned its previous position, which called for testing as long as there was no progress in the INF talks.

Liberal defence critic Douglas Frith said it is time to tell Washington that the tests are no longer needed and no longer welcome.

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International Trade Minister Patricia Carney said the decision not to call a halt to the tests is consistent with the Government's policy within NATO.

In today's test, the unarmed air-launched missile will ride aboard a U.S. Air Force B-52 strategic bomber in a "captive carry" test of the missile's guidance system. 08309

BEIJING REVIEW Cites Soviet 'Flexibility'

52004009 Beijing *BEIJING REVIEW* in English
16-22 Nov 87 pp 14-15

[Article by Wan Di: "Soviets Bite the Bullet in Arms Talks"]

[Text] While Moscow's flexibility in arms control talks will facilitate an INF accord between the two superpowers, Washington's rigidity may block them from trying for another part.

The Soviet Union and the United States have at least agreed on a summit meeting which will be held in Washington on December 7 and again in Moscow in the first half of 1988. The announcement was made after a lightning shuttling of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze between Moscow and Washington. Their meetings centred on arms reduction, particularly limitations on long-range strategic arms, and the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI, also known as the "Star Wars" programme), which nearly crushed hopes for the coming summit. However, Soviet flexibility and a shared need for the final agreement on global elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles assured a meeting of the leaders of the two countries.

Using the intermediate nuclear force (INF) treaty as an "icebreaker" to encourage talks on the strategic arms reduction treaty (START), both Moscow and Washington are preparing to advance further with arms talks. When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev first proposed a 50 percent cut in strategic missile stockpiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and strategic bombers, he insisted that the cut be linked to a winding down in the development and testing of Reagan's cherished SDI, and that neither side withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty for at least 10 years.

Whenever the two superpowers tackle the arms reduction question, Moscow attempts to link progress in arms control to demands for SDI restrictions. However, Reagan won't budge on the issue. Since its introduction in 1983, SDI has been a stumbling block in nuclear arms talks and the cause of the breakdown in the Iceland summit a year ago. Declaring that it is a defensive system capable of rendering nuclear missiles obsolete, the Reagan administration has been pushing for an increased budget for SDI and seeking a broad interpretation of the ABM treaty which will free SDI of its yoke. Furthermore, fears for the security of the United States and its Western allies after the withdrawal of INF weapons are making it more difficult for Reagan to concede to the Soviet Union over space weaponry.

The Soviets, though not completely giving up their stance, have now adjusted their policy towards the "Star Wars" programme with a view to achieving progress first in talks on offensive strategic arms. They consider cuts in

strategic weapons the "key problem," and to this end they have bit the bullet on the question of SDI restrictions. A new Soviet proposal permits SDI technology in five areas—kinetic kill vehicles, particle and laser beams, electromagnetic weapons and space-based mirrors—to be tested in space, but the testing of other more powerful systems will be confined to ground laboratories.

Refusing to budge on the 10-year adherence to the ABM treaty, Gorbachev has proposed that both sides cease violations of the treaty by consigning to mothballs the Soviet ABM radar installation in Krasnoyarsk and the U.S. installation in Scotland. Washington made no response to the suggestion. Sources say that the development, testing and manufacture of the extravagant SDI package require seven years and Washington has been insisting on compliance with the ABM treaty only for that time period. Since there is strong opposition in Congress to the White House's broad interpretation of the ABM treaty, the possibility of the Reagan administration yielding on this point is becoming more unlikely.

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Conference on Nuclear Strategy Concludes

52004014 Beijing *JIEFANGJUN BAO* in Chinese
21 Nov 87 p 1

[Text] Wuhan, 20 November: "China's research in nuclear strategic theory has achieved major breakthroughs in development and has initially formed a theoretical system with Chinese characteristics." This news was conveyed from China's first conference on nuclear strategic theory which concluded today.

In recent years, following the development of China's nuclear strength, our nuclear strategic theory has begun to make progress in terms of depth, compass, and systematization. There were especially important breakthroughs relating to the status and role of China's nuclear strength in the international nuclear strategic picture, and the development of our nuclear strength and its relation to our international status, economic construction, and geographic conditions.

Foreign Ministry Holds News Conference, Opposes Arms Race in Space

11021102 Beijing *XINHUA* in English
1055 GMT 2 Dec 87

[Text] Beijing, December 2 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today that China opposes the "extension of arms race to the outer space" and hopes for an early conclusion of a treaty on banning arms race in the outer space.

Asked to comment on Mikhail Gorbachev's recent statement on the Strategic Defense Initiative at the weekly news briefing this afternoon, the spokesman said that

China has always opposed to the arms race and held that the outer space is the common property of the mankind. "It should be used only for peaceful purposes," he said.

The spokesman said China hopes for an early conclusion of an agreement to ban arms race in the outer space, prohibit the research, manufacture, testing, development, production, deployment and application of all weapons used in Star Wars, and eliminate the existing weaponry system in the outer space.

He also said that as a country with certain capability in space undertaking China will strive for peaceful use of the outer space.

Commentary Praises UN Disarmament Resolution
06031505 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
2 Dec 87 p 6

[Commentary by RENMIN RIBAO reporter Liu Kai-chen (04917030 1368): "Reflecting Realistic Demand, Winning Universal Support—Two Disarmament Motions Sponsored by PRC Unanimously Adopted at the UN"]

[Text] UN, 30 Nov—The UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the PRC sponsored motions on nuclear disarmament and on the reduction of conventional arms. These two were written down in an official UN resolution today. This is the result of China's untiring efforts to promote disarmament to safeguard world peace. It reflects the strong aspirations of the world people; hence, the universal support of the international society.

China has all along attached importance to the disarmament issue. For years, China has put forth a series of constructive proposals regarding the principle and measures of disarmament in the UN. At the 41st UN General Assembly in 1986, the Chinese representative first proposed the two draft resolutions on disarmament, and they were adopted. At the current session of the UN General Assembly, new contents were added to the two draft resolutions on disarmament, apart from reaffirming the basic spirit that the United States and the Soviet Union have special responsibilities to take the lead in disarmament.

These two resolutions suit the development of the situation and have great realistic significance.

Some progress has been made in the disarmament talks over the past year. The United States and the Soviet Union have reached a principled accord on scrapping their intermediate-, medium-, and short-range missiles deployed in Europe and Asia. They plan to officially initial the accord on 8 December. For the first time in history, it will be possible to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. Thus, U.S.-USSR relations and

the tense international situation will be relaxed to some extent. Therefore, the medium-range missiles accord has won the welcome of all nations throughout the world.

However, the number of intermediate-, medium-, and short-range missiles to be reduced in the U.S.-USSR agreement accounts for only 3 to 4 percent of the total number of warheads in their nuclear arsenals. Militarily speaking, this affects the nuclear forces of neither party. Moreover, the nuclear arms race in other respects is continuing. In the 1987-1988 fiscal year, the number of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads will increase by 1,100, while the Soviet Union's will increase by 400. Apart from the increase in quantity, the quality of nuclear weaponry continues to be improved. At present, the strategic weaponry of both the United States and the USSR has already reached the saturation point in quantity, with a high accuracy in launching, and the quantity is enough to destroy the earth over and over again. Besides, both the United States and the USSR are pushing their nuclear arms race into space. These conditions show that the potential nuclear war threat still remains. For the sake of world peace and security, therefore, it is vitally important to demand the United States and the USSR take the lead in reducing their nuclear weaponry by a wide margin.

While showing deep concern for nuclear disarmament, international society has also attached great importance to the reduction of conventional weapons. The conventional weapons of all nations should be confined to self-defense. It should not threaten the security of another nation. When the U.S.-USSR medium-range missiles accord is reached, the armament of conventional weapons in Europe will become all the more conspicuous. The two major military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact headed by the United States and the USSR respectively, not only possess mighty nuclear arsenals but also powerful conventional weapons. Their direct confrontation always places Europe under threat. Therefore, international society also demands the United States and the USSR as well as the two major military blocs take the lead in reducing their conventional weapons by a wide margin, offensive conventional forces primarily. This would help safeguard peace and stability in Europe as well as the world. This is entirely fair and reasonable.

Every nation, big or small, strong or weak has equal right to participation in deliberating and settling the disarmament issue. The joint efforts of all countries and the concern for the international society have played a role in promoting the achievement of the U.S.-USSR medium-range missiles principled accord. The several reports on disarmament, including the Chinese motions adopted at the UN Assembly today, will better motivate the peoples of all countries to demand the superpowers end the arms race and strive for world disarmament.

Media Reports on U.S.-USSR INF Treaty

INF Treaty 'Sets Precedent'

06110721 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
10 Dec 87 p 6

[Article by Zhang Wen (1728 2429): "Putting Forward a Small Step in 6 Years"]

[Text] The United States and the Soviet Union have finally signed a treaty on destroying all medium- and short-range missiles after 6 long years of difficult talks. If this treaty is endorsed, the United States and Soviet Union will destroy within 3 years all land-based nuclear missiles with a range of fire from 500 to 5,000 km. These missiles carry a total of over 2,400 warheads. The number of missiles to be destroyed by the Soviet Union will more than double that of the United States.

This treaty sets a precedent in some aspects:

—This is the first treaty on cutting nuclear arms in the history of disarmament of the two superpowers;

—The strictness of the inspection measures stipulated in the treaty is unprecedented. The treaty stipulates that inspection personnel from both sides shall reside at missile plants and installations—which have all along been regarded as top secret, prohibited areas—to conduct surprise inspections and so on;

—The treaty is conducive to enhancing future arms talks, especially talks on offensive strategic weapons.

The history of the talks on the INF Treaty is a tortuous process in which the two superpowers repeatedly weighed military and political advantages and disadvantages and scrambled for an advantageous position, and is also the result of compromise necessitated by domestic politics.

The signing of the INF Treaty is, after all, a small step taken in the long course of nuclear arms reduction and is welcomed by the U.S. and Soviet people and people of the whole world. The people of the world hope that the United States and Soviet Union will continue to advance and take greater steps on the road to nuclear disarmament.

At present, it is reported that the endorsement of the INF Treaty will encounter many obstacles in the U.S. Senate. Conservative forces in the United States are trying hard to oppose this treaty and will do their utmost to prevent its endorsement. However, 77 votes [as published] are needed to veto the endorsement of this treaty, and the opposition party has only 17 votes at present. It is estimated that the treaty may be endorsed after heated debate.

Beijing Radio on Treaty

11111432 Beijing International Service in Mandarin
0900 GMT 11 Dec 87

[News analysis by station reporter (Fan Qinglong) from Washington: The INF Treaty Is a Product of Compromise Between the United States and the Soviet Union Out of Their Own Needs]

[Text] U.S. President Reagan and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Gorbachev signed the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty in the White House on the afternoon of 8 December. According to the treaty, the two countries will destroy all their intermediate- and short-range missiles in 3 years. It is the first treaty in the history of arms control that reduces nuclear weapons by the superpowers. It is a product of compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union out of their own needs. It is also the first achievement made by Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign affairs, as well as the first breakthrough made by the 7-year-old Reagan administration in arms control. The treaty will no doubt strengthen the two leaders' positions in their respective countries.

After Irangate, Reagan suffered a series of setbacks—such as the stock market slump and the failure of two Supreme Court nominees—which hurt his prestige at home and abroad. Now, he has signed a nuclear arms treaty which is considered to be advantageous to the United States in terms of the number of missiles to be reduced. Also, the Soviet Union has yielded to U.S. insistence and changed its original attitude of opposing on-site verification. These seem to show the success of Reagan's policy of negotiating with the Soviet Union for real interests. This is an important opportunity for him to revive his prestige. Moreover, reduction of nuclear weapons can save some funds and ease the conflict between the Reagan administration and Congress over the deficit cut.

For Gorbachev, the INF Treaty is the beginning of improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Such an international environment is what he urgently needs to ensure a smooth course for the economic reform at home. The treaty has also created the conditions for him to reduce the large military budget, develop the economy, and increase the overall strength of the Soviet Union.

Militarily speaking, the Soviet Union has not suffered any loss, either. U.S. Pershing-2 missiles pose a great threat to the heartland of the Soviet Union, as they can destroy the operational commands in the Soviet Union and major cities in the western Soviet Union within 13 minutes. Elimination of these missiles means elimination of serious hidden danger to the Soviet Union. It is even more important that the treaty in the long run will improve the image of the Soviet Union and estrange Western nations from the United States.

The Soviets have frankly admitted that their deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe in the 1970's was a mistake, because it strengthened unity among West European countries and between them and the United States and worsened the relations between the Soviet Union and West Europe. The treaty is precisely a correction of this historical mistake.

The INF Treaty is the first step taken by the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear disarmament. However, U.S. media have pointed out that the treaty has not changed the world. The treaty only covers 4 percent of the two superpowers' nuclear arsenals. As their nuclear arsenals are over-saturated, the military significance of the treaty is very small. For this reason, the media call on the superpowers to accelerate negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons, and reach agreement so that people will have a true sense of security. In consideration of this, some U.S. senators have said that they will propose appropriate revisions to the INF Treaty if no progress is seen in the above-mentioned fields when the Senate examines the treaty.

Results Not 'Overly Optimistic'

11130500 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1404 GMT 12 Dec 87

["News Analysis by XINHUA reporter Li Yanning: Characteristics of Recent U.S.-USSR Summit"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, 11 Dec (XINHUA)—As the U.S.-Soviet summit is now over and thousands of reporters from various countries have returned home, we can review the 3-day meeting and find in it the following characteristics:

1. On the first day of the meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty and gave wide publicity to its significance. The treaty has prevented the two leaders from leaving the summit empty-handed.

2. Both sides tried to avoid disputes or deadlocks during their sessions, although they still have great differences on a number of issues, particularly on the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] or "Star Wars" program. Differences between them over SDI—which were the main cause of the failure of the last summit in Reykjavik—remain, and there has been no substantial change in their positions on the issue. As soon as Gorbachev's plane left Washington, Reagan said in a televised speech: "Our SDI program will continue, and when we have a defense ready to deploy, we will do so." It seems that Gorbachev knew that Reagan would not give up his SDI program. Therefore, he neither insisted on linking the SDI issue to a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, nor did he press Reagan to focus on it. Some people speculated before the summit that the Soviets, in an attempt to halt U.S. testing of the SDI in space and thereby delay its

completion, might raise the issue of the non-withdrawal period of the ABM Treaty and argue over the interpretation of the treaty. However, this did not happen.

Although the two sides debated a great deal about regional and human rights issues, they avoided open quarrel and left room for future negotiations. They decided to meet again in Moscow before July without any preconditions, such as resolving any specific issue. This has kept the door of continued dialogue open to the two leaders. As an American journalist said, the two leaders "agreed to disagree."

3. The atmosphere at the Washington summit was quite relaxed and may even be described as good, because of the aforementioned reasons and the publicity efforts made by both sides. In their open speeches, the two leaders kept repeating that they were ready to improve bilateral relations and live in harmony (the Soviet side said even more in this respect).

It seems that these three characteristics resulted because both sides, out of their political and economic needs, wanted to create an impression that they held a successful summit in Washington. A news analysis on the front page of today's WASHINGTON POST said: "Propelled by the imperatives of political self-interest and the burden of the arms race on their nations, President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev demonstrated this week they have found a new way to do business with each other."

The Soviet Union regards the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations as a key point in its effort to adopt a flexible foreign policy. It particularly wants to create a tendency of relaxation during Reagan's term, so that improvement of bilateral relations may continue during the term of Reagan's successor.

The United States also needs to readjust its Soviet policy in view of its internal and external political needs, to cope with some urgent and serious problems and prevent its world economic strength and political status from falling rapidly.

But as Reagan said in his welcoming speech, his meeting with Gorbachev was between adversaries. The United States and the Soviet Union no doubt remain the major adversaries in a global contention. They may feel that it is imperative for them to relax their intense confrontation of the last several years and improve relations. If so, it will certainly be welcomed by the people of all countries. Negotiation is better than no dialogue. However, people still have no reason to make an overly optimistic assessment of the 3-day meeting.

'No Reason for Euphoria'

11131315 Beijing in English to North America
0300 GMT 13 Dec 87

[Text] American President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said their personal good-bye in Washington last Thursday, but the impact of their

summit on bilateral relations is a long-term one. Our Washington correspondent, Zhang Guohua, looks at some of the implications.

President Reagan called that [summit] a clear success, and General Secretary Gorbachev said a good deal has been accomplished. Well, be it a success or an accomplishment, the Reagan-Gorbachev Washington summit did, indeed, produce something concrete—a treaty which for the first time in history would eliminate an entire class of the superpowers' medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles. The two leaders even managed to make some progress toward another treaty reducing the superpowers' strategic arms by 50 percent by establishing certain limits on certain categories of strategic nuclear weapons. Even the more contentious issue of President Reagan's Star Wars program did not break the two sides up. They agreed to conduct the research and development of the space-based antimissile defense system within the limit of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, commonly known as the ABM Treaty. And the summit has enabled Reagan and Gorbachev to establish a warmer personal relationship.

However, now that the summit is over and the media's (?hype) dies down, the summit's lack of achievement looks at least as obvious as its accomplishment. For instance, there is no progress on the Afghanistan issue or any other regional conflicts. On the 50 percent reduction of strategic arms, there is no breakthrough. Both sides agreed to allow Star Wars research and development to continue under the terms of the ABM Treaty, but how to interpret the ABM Treaty remains a major disputable issue.

In fact, even the medium-range missile treaty was not a direct achievement of the summit. Its terms were negotiated before the summit started. The fact that the summit, as held, made no breakthrough of major issues gives no reason for euphoria and may indicate that U.S.-Soviet relations beyond the Washington summit could still be difficult when negotiators from both countries return to the bargaining table.

Of course, the two countries will continue bargaining on regional issues, on human rights issues, and on other problems in U.S.-Soviet relations, but the focus will still be on arms control. Both Reagan and Gorbachev pledged to continue efforts to work out a strategic arms reduction treaty to be signed at next year's summit in Moscow. However, enormous difficulties remain. Apart from overcoming disputes on President Reagan's Star Wars program, the new treaty will require far more complicated verification than the medium-range missile treaty and far more concession from each side. And it has to be completed in a much shorter time—in a matter of months—if it is to be signed at next year's Moscow summit. Can it be done? No one knows for sure, even after this Washington summit of success or accomplishment.

Commentary on Treaty Signing

11092015 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in
Chinese 1430 GMT 9 Dec 87

[Commentary by XINHUA reporter Wang Chongjie:
"After the Signing of the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty"]

[Text] Washington, 8 Dec (XINHUA)—At the East Room of the White House this afternoon, U.S. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev officially signed the U.S.-Soviet treaty on destroying intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles. Both of them were smiling and looked very pleased. After signing their names on a thick dossier of documents, they exchanged the texts and, for souvenirs, they exchanged the fountain pens used for their signatures. Then, as they warmly shook hands with one another, everyone in the room applauded. Without doubt, the treaty is something to be welcomed if it can be effectively implemented. However, people are more concerned with whether or not the treaty will lead to drastic reductions of arms of all descriptions.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have undergone a tension-ridden, complex, and tortuous process, which began with deploying intermediate and short-range missiles and ended with agreeing to destroy them. Because of the two countries' fierce competition and confrontation on intermediate missiles, which further escalated the arms race and worsened international situation, they were strongly condemned by world public opinion.

According to the INF Treaty they signed today, the United States and the Soviet Union will destroy all their intermediate and short-range missiles within 3 years. Naturally, this first decision made by the two superpowers to reduce their nuclear weapons is a good thing. However, the quantity of the missiles they will destroy represents only 3 to 4 percent of their nuclear arsenals. Apparently, this is only the first step taken by the two countries toward disarmament.

On other occasions today, both the U.S. and Soviet leaders have time and again commented on the treaty. Reagan said that it was a "historic treaty," and Gorbachev said that it was a "great step" toward the future. At the same time, however, Reagan added that it was only the first step, and Gorbachev indicated that "it is still too early to bestow laurels upon each other."

Will the development of the U.S.-Soviet arms race begin to take a turn from now on?

Reagan maintained that both the United States and the Soviet Union "had been the pursuers as well as the prisoners of the arms race for a long time. This situation is not destined to be unalterable." Gorbachev maintained that the Soviet Union and the United States should "smash the logic of an arms race." He hoped that "8 December 1987 will mark a watershed separating the

era of mounting risk of nuclear war from the era of a demilitarization of human life." Nevertheless, in which direction the arms race will develop from now on will depend on the course they will choose.

The U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty was reached after vigorous bargaining by the two countries. What the leaders of the two countries did today was nothing but perform the last formalities—signing them. Regarding the many pressing issues that need to be resolved, the two countries still differ greatly. Although both countries have indicated willingness to cut 50 percent of their offensive strategic weapons, their disputes over the percentage of all types of weapons to be reduced as well as offensive strategic weapons and the SDI remain unresolved. Nor has there been any progress made on the reduction of conventional weapons—a subject that has been discussed for a long time. If the two countries only ban intermediate missiles but continue to compete in the area of strategic weapons and space weapons—which are of even greater threat—and continue to build up their conventional weaponry, then the significance of the INF treaty will be quite limited. Furthermore, certain regional conflicts in the world caused directly or indirectly by the two superpowers also need urgent solution. We have to see how U.S. and Soviet leaders will answer these issues during their meeting in Washington.

Commentary Views Results

11111228 Beijing XINHUA in English
1208 GMT 11 Dec 87

["Commentary: A Preliminary Analysis of U.S.-Soviet Summit, by Wang Chongjie"—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, December 10 (XINHUA)—The biggest achievement made in the just-ended Soviet summit seems to be the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, as no major breakthrough was announced on reducing strategic nuclear arms or other issues although the atmosphere of the talks was described as good.

The treaty, the first genuine nuclear disarmament accord, which came after arduous negotiations and bargaining, constitutes only the first step in the nuclear disarmament process. It stipulates that the two countries will eliminate all their intermediate-range missiles within three years.

At the farewell ceremony held today by U.S. President Ronald Reagan for the visiting Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Reagan described the treaty as only the beginning, not the end, while Gorbachev expressed the hope that this treaty will become the start of a nuclear disarmament process. However, both sides admitted that no new agreements on disarmament were reached during the summit.

On cutting by half their strategic offensive weapons, the central theme of their talks, the differences between the two sides still remain. While Reagan said the three-day summit helped accelerate strategic arms reduction talks, Gorbachev pointed out that the two sides "moved significantly ahead" on this issue. But they did not elaborate.

No substantial changes have been made in their original positions on how many weapons should be cut in each category on each side, on compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and on space arms.

Reagan stressed in a TV speech this evening that the United States will never give up its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) known as Star Wars program. On his part, Gorbachev reaffirmed at a press conference at the Soviet Embassy here that if Washington continues its SDI program, then Moscow will make its reaction. It seems that both countries will continue haggling over the relation between reduction in strategic arms and adherence to the 1972 treaty limiting anti-ballistic defense missile system.

As to regional issues, although the two leaders held "helpful" discussions, they failed to meet the expectations of the world people. At the meeting, each side explained its own stands. Reagan said both sides were quite frank but efforts should be made to seek real political settlement of some of the regional conflicts while Gorbachev described such explanations as helpful. However, the two parties each stick to their own positions. Take the Afghanistan problem as example. Gorbachev stressed that a Soviet military pullout from the country and an end to U.S. aid to resistance forces should take place at the same time.

In the past three years Reagan and Gorbachev have met three times in Reykjavik, Geneva and Washington, with the last meeting conducted in a more relaxed atmosphere than the previous two. The INF Treaty signed during the last meeting represented a concrete achievement of their joint endeavor.

The world people, while expressing their welcome to the treaty, also hope that on the basis of the treaty, the two countries will continue their discussions on cutting strategic nuclear arms and destroying chemical and biological weapons and reach agreements conducive to the relaxation of the international situation.

Destruction of Weapons Viewed

06111030 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
11 Dec 87 p 6

[Article by Qi Hua (0796 5478): "The Arms Race Is Undesirable"]

[Text] After holding difficult talks for more than 6 years, the heads of the United States and the Soviet Union have finally signed the treaty on intermediate-range missiles.

Western countries have all expressed favorable reactions to this. Before the treaty was signed, the people were thinking of something far beyond the treaty itself. On 26 November, LE MATIN of Paris published a cartoon and an article entitled "Missiles Reduced, Military Expenses Still High," which pointed out that the United States had already spent \$9 billion on producing the Pershing-2 and ground-launched cruise missiles and deploying them in Western Europe. The Soviet Union had also spent a huge sum of money on deploying its SS-20 missiles. Now these intermediate-range missiles have to be thrown into the garbage cans. However, destroying these nuclear weapons is not as easy as disposing of ordinary garbage. Whether or not they are blown up in the air or destroyed on the ground, a large sum of money will undoubtedly be spent. What worries press circles even more is: In the course of destroying the intermediate-range missiles, will the West prepare to "modernize its conventional weapons" so as to make up for the unfavorable balance in military strength? Will the Soviet Union further improve its backward technology? If so, does it not mean that both sides will have to spend even more money on these things than it did on producing and deploying the intermediate-range missiles?

PRC President Welcomes Signing

11100806 Beijing XINHUA in English 0738 GMT
10 Dec 87

[Text] Beijing, December 10 (XINHUA)—"China welcomes the signing of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to scrap intermediate-range nuclear weapons," Chinese President Li Xiannian said today.

"Generally speaking, this year the international situation is developing favorably, Li said at a meeting with six new ambassadors to China, "and when U.S. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev signed the pact on December 8, we welcomed the event." [quotation marks as received]

"This is only a small step forward," Li said, "because the number of warheads to be eliminated under the treaty only accounts for three to four percent of the total nuclear warheads the United States and the Soviet Union have stockpiled."

"More important, a lot of strategic nuclear weapons, chemical, biological and powerful conventional weapons still exist," Li went on, "so the road to disarmament is long, and I hope the two countries will continue negotiations in this regard."

Prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, eliminating nuclear weapons and reducing the number of conventional weapons to the minimum will help prevent war, Li said, and only in this way will the world's people be at ease.

"All the world's people hope for peace, not war, and seek construction, not destruction," Li pointed out, "and people of both developed and developing countries have the same desire."

The new ambassadors to China represent Gabon, Mexico, Jordan, Oman, Japan and Belgium, and Li welcomed them by expressing the hope for friendly cooperation.

Reaction of West European Leaders to INF Treaty

UK's Thatcher 'Hopeful'

11110450 Beijing XINHUA in English
0228 GMT 11 Dec 87

[Text] London, December 10 (XINHUA)—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said today she is "hopeful" that the United States and the Soviet Union will agree to reduce strategic nuclear missiles.

Mrs. Thatcher said she believes U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev have paved the way for further arms reduction agreements at their Washington summit.

"I think they will get the agreement on strategic missiles ... I think it's within our grasp," she said in an interview with Britain's commercial television.

The prime minister said she believes the U.S.-Soviet intermediate nuclear forces (INF) treaty will be honored by both sides, but she added that Britain's independent submarine nuclear deterrent will not be subject to their agreement.

"It is very clear to President Reagan and to Mr. Gorbachev that both French and British independent nuclear deterrents were not in these negotiations," she said.

"Even at a reduction of 50 percent in strategic arms missiles, (Britain's) Trident is still a very small proportion of what the Soviets have been left," she said, adding: "Our independent deterrence is really an irreducible minimum."

Asked whether the INF treaty will lead to a nuclear-free world, Mrs. Thatcher said, "I don't think it's attainable. I am interested in a war-free world, particularly a war-free Europe where the last two world wars started.

"To keep a war-free Europe, you need, I believe, to keep a nuclear deterrent."

NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington also warned against reducing Atlantic alliance defenses in response to the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty.

"We have to maintain the credibility of the nuclear deterrent—both the strategic and the shorter-range," he said in an interview with a British monthly defense

magazine, "and look very carefully at the inter-relationship of all these arms control talks, so as not to unbalance our deterrent by going too far in one direction and not far enough in the other."

French Leaders Comment

11101054 Beijing XINHUA in English
0259 GMT 9 Dec 87

[Text] Paris, December 8 (XINHUA)—French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac said today the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) agreement will be a "positive agreement if followed by other accords which will reinforce European security".

Chirac, speaking in a television interview at the end of his visit to the French Department of Nord-Pas-de-Calais, said "this single accord (INF) does not essentially re-inforce the security of Europe which remains threatened by a considerable amount of armaments."

He said "the strategic arms of the superpowers should be the object of a treaty on (arms) reduction" and only at that moment, will the INF accord be a truly historic accord.

French President Francois Mitterrand, who is visiting the Saone-et-Loire Department, said he supported the INF accord which was signed earlier today by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington.

"The choice is to disarm or super-arm", Mitterrand said, "my choice is made; we must disarm and we must reject the argument of those who say no to us."

Italian Officials Welcome Treaty

11101302 Beijing XINHUA in English
0251 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Text] Rome, December 9 (XINHUA)—Italy welcomes the signing of the superpower treaty on scrapping intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and expects early approval from the U.S. Senate, officials here have stated.

Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti said the treaty, signed Tuesday in Washington, has removed an immediate threat to Europe.

Europe has played a decisive role in the negotiations on and off for more than six years, he added.

He said the INF treaty has protected Europe's "special interests" in NATO which also includes the United States and Canada.

In an article that appeared in the latest issue of IL TEMPO, Minister of the Interior Amintore Fanfani said that only through firm international agreements by the superpowers can the dreadful consequences of the arms race be avoided.

The United States and Soviet Union would be the first to perish should the arms competition get out of control, he warned.

In a joint statement, Italy's three major labor unions said they are "very satisfied" with the signing of the INF treaty and urged the congresses of the superpowers to verify it.

They also called for cuts in the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals and a new balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in chemical and conventional arms at the lowest level.

Greek Prime Minister Hails Treaty

11101320 Beijing XINHUA in English
0209 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Text] Athens, December 9 (XINHUA)—Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu today expressed his approval of the signing of the superpower treaty on elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

He said in a statement that the INF agreement, signed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington Tuesday, is "possibly the most important achievement since the end of World War II."

"The two nuclear powers this time have not only signed an agreement for limiting the rate of increase of a category of weapons, but for withdrawing and dismantling the SS-20, Pershing 1a, Pershing-2 and cruise missiles from Europe," Papandreu said. "This is an event of immense importance," the prime minister said. "It is a historic turn toward peace." He said however that the signing of the INF Treaty "is not the end, but the beginning of a new chapter".

He called on the superpowers to make further effort to rid the world of other weapons such as strategic and short-range nuclear missiles and chemical weapons, and to stop the militarization of space.

Turkey 'Pleased' by INF Treaty

11101405 Beijing XINHUA in English
0038 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Text] Ankara, December 9 (XINHUA)—Turkey declared today that it regarded the U.S.-USSR treaty signed in Washington for scrapping intermediate range missiles as a "historic step" in East-West relations.

Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Inal Batu made the remarks at his weekly press conference here, local TV reported tonight.

Turkey was "pleased" with the signing of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and believes that the treaty will be an example for future disarmament accords, he added.

Turkey expects the INF Treaty to contribute to the strengthening of security between the East and West and thus pave the way for positive developments in other disarmament spheres, he said.

Turkey wants the inclusion of chemical and conventional weapons in the global disarmament process, he said.

Batu underlined that the ultimate target should be to strengthen global security and stability.

Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu, who is currently in Brussels, said the INF Treaty will be evaluated at length within the NATO alliance, taking into consideration the strategic and geographic positions of all NATO member countries.

Meanwhile, Turkey's main opposition Social Democrat Populist Party leader Erdal Inonu said he hopes all countries will follow in the footsteps of the U.S. and Soviet Union in disarmament.

Commentary on INF Treaty, SDI, ABM Issue
11161253 Beijing in Russian to the USSR
1800 GMT 14 Dec 87

["International News Review" program]

[Text] [Announcer] The Soviet-U.S. summit in Washington has been widely commented on by the world public. In today's "International News Review" program, we will ask our commentator Hung Bo to discuss this issue.

[Hung Bo] The result of the summit meeting in Washington did not reach the expectations of the people. A long-negotiated agreement on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles was signed. However, no breakthrough on the key question was achieved, that is, the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and other related strategic defensive weapons. Progress has only been achieved in the area of establishing a limit on strategic nuclear weapons.

At the Reykjavik summit meeting last year, both sides had already agreed to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. At the present Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, the American side agreed to the proposal to limit the number of long-range missiles launched from submarines, and both sides reached agreement on verification measures. But after the 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms, there still remain a number of difficult questions pertaining to the reduction of the balance of different types of long-range missiles; these questions have not been resolved. Because of this, both sides feel the need for a (?serious) breakthrough on the reduction of strategic arms. The Soviet Union has always demanded that the reduction of strategic arms be tied to limitations being placed on the U.S. SDI program, but at the present meeting, Gorbachev expressed his intention not to discuss this program with Reagan. American

observers view this statement by Gorbachev as the abandonment by the Soviet Union of its original position on this issue. At the same time, we must keep in mind that Gorbachev spoke about the need for the United States to strictly abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty. Before the beginning of the summit, we raised the question of whether they would reach a compromise on the ABM issue. This question continues to attract the attention of the people.

The results of the summit show that both parties have avoided the repetition of the Reykjavik practice and have remained true to their opinions.

It has been reported that the leaders of the two countries said at the summit meeting that their representatives at the Geneva talks will try for an agreement that would allow both sides, while abiding by the treaty, to conduct research permissible by the treaty to development and test space weapons. Since the United States chooses to interpret this treaty broadly—taking the position that according to the treaty space weapons can be produced for experimental purposes—then I think that Reagan will continue to act in accordance with his understanding of the treaty.

After Gorbachev departed Washington, Reagan, in a television appearance to the nation, stated unambiguously that the United States will continue to work on SDI. He also said that should this arms system be deployable, then the United States will indeed deploy it.

Gorbachev, at the news conference prior to his departure from Washington, emphasized once again his position against the SDI program. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand the claim that although the summit was successful, disagreements between the leaders still exist. I think these differences are not limited only to the area of arms control, but also on matters of regional questions.

One of the regional issues that continues to attract attention is the Afghan question. Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union could withdraw its forces from Afghanistan within 12 months or perhaps even sooner. At the same time, he demanded that the United States cease rendering help to the Afghan resistance forces from the moment the USSR begins withdrawing its forces from the country.

Under the present conditions, when there is a growing number of people in the Soviet Union demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the world community is naturally interested in how the Soviet authorities will act in the future.

However, let us return to the topic under discussion: I agree that the summit had achieved a certain progress. After the signing of the INF treaty, both Gorbachev and Reagan have stressed, on numerous occasions, the historic significance of this treaty. Presently, the slowing of

the arms race and the lowering of international tension represent the universal aspiration of the peoples of the world. Therefore, the Soviet Union and the United States must go forward by taking the second and the third steps. Failing that, the treaty on the elimination of the medium-range missiles will lose what limited significance it has.

In the joint statement released after the end of the Washington meeting, both sides expressed their desire, in the near future, to reach an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic weapons. Perhaps this could be achieved in time for signature by the two leaders at next year's summit in Moscow. However, this new agreement is still very much up in the air, since there are differences in the composition of nuclear weapons of the two sides and the difficulties of verification have not been resolved. Added to this is the fact that the positions of the parties on the question of strategic defense remains diametrically opposed.

Certainly, it must be said that the people of the world expect and will welcome such an agreement. Moreover, they will watch with interest just how long the atmosphere, generated by the third meeting, will last, and whether the United States and the Soviet Union will be prepared to undertake new, even greater steps on the path of nuclear disarmament.

PRC Journal on Course of INF Talks
06161034 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese No 50, 14 Dec 87 pp 27-28

[Article by Xiong Changyi (3574 2490 5030): "Intermediate-Range Missile Talks—The Whole Story"]

[Text] The hard talks on intermediate-range missiles have now finally achieved results. The talks lasted 7 years and underwent many twists and turns, especially some extremely fierce bargaining.

The dispute over intermediate-range missiles was triggered by the Soviet Union's deployment of SS-20 missiles in 1977. The United States and its West European allies held that the deployment of more advanced intermediate-range missiles disrupted the nuclear balance in Europe. Thus, the NATO Council decided on 12 December 1979 to begin deploying 572 U.S.-made Pershing-2 missiles and land-based cruise missiles from late 1983. At the same time, it proposed that negotiations be held with the Soviet Union over the issue of the intermediate-range missiles. However, the Soviet Union pointed out that only when NATO scrapped its deployment plan and the U.S. Congress ratified SALT II would it agree to negotiate with the United States over the issue of intermediate-range missiles. In the fall of 1980, the Soviet Union gave up these preconditions and held preliminary talks with the United States in Geneva in October and November. However, the two sides held far different positions and failed to reach an agreement on the time, place, and negotiating level of the official talks. Things

were delayed until 24 September 1981, when the foreign ministers of the two countries reached an agreement on the time, place, and official level of the formal talks.

The official talks began on 30 November 1981 and were suspended on 23 November 1983. During this period, the representatives of the 2 countries held 6 rounds of talks, a total of 111 meetings, in Geneva. They drove hard bargains with each other. The Soviet Union successively put forth the "freeze option," the "phased reduction scheme" between the Soviet Union and NATO, the "equal reduction scheme," and two or three other proposals. The Soviet Union's basic position was to stop the deployment of the new type of U.S.-made missiles in Western Europe, and at the same time try to maintain its own SS-20 missiles. It held that even if it had to reduce these missiles, it at least must maintain a number of intermediate-range missiles equivalent to the total of those possessed by France and Britain. The United States also successively put forth four to five proposals, including the "zero option" and the so-called "interim agreement." Its basic position was that only if the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate all SS-20 missiles in Europe would the United States agree to call off its plan to deploy the new intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe. Even if it agreed to cut down on the number of missiles to be deployed or allowed the Soviet Union to maintain more intermediate-range missiles in Europe than the United States, the number of warheads for intermediate-range missiles possessed by the Soviet Union in the global sphere must be equivalent to that of the United States. The sharp confrontation between the two sides' positions deadlocked the talks. On 14 November 1983 the first batch of cruise missiles were shipped to Britain, and on 24 November 1983 the first batch of Pershing-2 missiles were delivered to the FRG. On 23 November 1983 the Soviet Union announced its withdrawal from the talks, and the talks were suspended indefinitely. The Soviet Union also declared that it would take countermeasures against the United States' deployment of the new intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe by deploying SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 tactical missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union also suspended the third phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which began on 29 June 1982 and which had already held five rounds. Then, all U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms talks were completely suspended, and relations between the two countries reached the coldest point since the "Cuban missile crisis."

At that point in March 1983, President Reagan announced the "Strategic Defense Initiative," and the Soviet Union shifted its attention to opposing the U.S. development of space weapons. On 29 June 1984 the Soviet Union proposed the convening of talks on preventing the militarization of outer space, and required that as soon as the talks begin, all tests and deployment of space weapons be immediately stopped on a temporary basis. The United States issued a statement the same evening, saying that it agreed to enter into talks

with the Soviet Union on the issue of space weapons, but that this must be linked with the suspended talks on intermediate-range missiles and strategic weapons. Since each side disagreed with the other's preconditions, the proposed talks failed to open on schedule. On 7 and 8 January 1985, the foreign ministers of the two countries met in Geneva and agreed on the package plan to carry out negotiations on all issues concerning strategic weapons, intermediate-range missiles, and space weapons.

During the 19 months between March 1985 and the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in Iceland in October 1986, the Soviet Union insisted on linking the reduction in strategic weapons with the issue of the nonmilitarization of outer space, but it did not insist on linking the talks on intermediate-range missiles with space weapons. During the Iceland summit meeting, Gorbachev made a major concession on the issue of intermediate-range missiles by accepting the "zero option" of the United States and giving up his original requirement of including the French and British missiles in the considerations. Both sides agreed to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles in Europe, with the Soviet Union maintaining 100 such missiles in its Asian territory and the United States also maintaining the same number of such missiles in its own territory. They also agreed to begin negotiations on short-range missiles in Europe. However, when the two sides almost reached an agreement, Gorbachev suddenly required that all this must be preconditioned by an agreement on space weapons. As a result, the almost successful summit meeting achieved no results, because the two sides could not reach agreement on the scope of space weapons tests.

On 28 February 1987, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union was willing to "deal with the issue of European intermediate-range missiles by separating it from other weapons issues," so as to "conclude a separate agreement on this issue" on the basis of the agreements reached at the Reykjavik summit meeting. This Soviet proposal broke the deadlock in the intermediate-range missile talks and was welcomed by President Reagan. Afterward, the United States and the Soviet Union successively put forth their respective treaty drafts in the Geneva talks. Then, new differences appeared. The United States and its West European allies held that since the Soviet Union holds superiority in the field of short-range missiles in Europe, the issue of intermediate-missiles must be linked to the issue of short-range missiles.

On 10 April, shortly before U.S. Secretary of State Shultz' visit to Moscow, Gorbachev announced in Prague that the Soviet Union agreed to hold talks on reducing and destroying intermediate-range missiles with ranges from 500 to 1,000 km. The United States and its NATO allies convened an urgent meeting because of this announcement. At a NATO Council meeting held 11-12 June, the NATO foreign ministers stated that if inspections and verification were possible, they would support the elimination of U.S. and Soviet short- and

intermediate-range missiles from the world. On 15 June, Reagan said that if effective mutual inspections and verification of missiles could be carried out on a global scale, including the Soviet SS-21 and SS-23 missiles, and if the relevant clauses and articles were enshrined in the treaty, the United States would agree to the abolishment of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles. The next day, the United States put forward a proposal in Geneva. The United States stressed that it was more preferable to eliminate the U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles on a global scale. On 22 July, Gorbachev accepted the U.S. "zero option" on eliminating short- and intermediate-range missiles.

However, at that time, the point at issue was centered on the FRG's 72 Pershing-1A missiles, which are equipped with U.S.-made warheads. The Soviet Union insisted that any treaty on eliminating short- and intermediate-range nuclear weapons should include the FRG's Pershing-1A missiles. But the United States maintained that talks on intermediate-range missiles were bilateral negotiations covering the missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union only, without involving the missiles of a third country or any established cooperation among allies. The two sides stuck to their own views without making any concessions. The Pershing-1A missiles thus became a major stumbling block in the U.S.-Soviet talks on intermediate-range missiles. On 26 August, FRG Chancellor Kohl declared that once the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on short- and intermediate-range missiles, the FRG would be willing to demolish its Pershing-1A missiles, thus paving the way for the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty.

After that, the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers met in Washington on 15-17 September. The two sides then reached an agreement in principle on eliminating intermediate-range missiles. It was also announced that Shultz would visit the Soviet Union in October to discuss the agenda and date of the summit meeting. Shultz arrived in Moscow on 22 October. However, Gorbachev stated that his purpose in visiting the United States was not only to sign the INF Treaty, and that the two countries should reach an agreement on not withdrawing from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. As a result, the two foreign ministers did not make any progress during their meetings.

In the face of the cold and detached Soviet attitude, the United States never gave an impression of weakness, and refused to say anything about the signing of the treaty. The Soviet Union became very uneasy. Several days after Shultz returned to the United States, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced that Gorbachev would visit the United States within the year. On 30 October, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze carried a letter from Gorbachev to the United States. On 23-24 November, the two foreign ministers met again in Geneva. The two sides eventually decided that Gorbachev would visit

the United States on 7 December to sign the INF Treaty. It was also announced that both sides hoped President Reagan would visit the Soviet Union during the first half of next year.

USSR Asks U.S. To Curb Asian Nuclear Arms
11180141 Beijing XINHUA in English
1914 GMT 17 Dec 87

[Text] Moscow, December 17 (XINHUA)—The Soviet Union will not increase the number of its aircraft in the Asian region if the United States does not deploy additional nuclear weapons in the area able to reach the Soviet Union.

Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, made the statement today while commenting on U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci's declaration.

Carlucci said that the forthcoming elimination of Soviet medium-range missiles, including those deployed in Asia, "did not mean a reduced Soviet military threat in the Asian-Pacific region."

However, Gerasimov claimed that the Soviet decision to eliminate medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country "helped to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation in the Asian-Pacific region."

Gerasimov added that the Soviet Union has expressed the hope that "the U.S. nuclear presence in that region would not grow."

On the recent Soviet-U.S. summit, Gerasimov said that the signing of the treaty on elimination of medium and shorter-range missiles was "a real breakthrough in the nuclear disarmament" between the two countries.

He said the summit in Washington means that the prolonged confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States has ended and that the relations between the two have reached a new stage.

He appreciated the NATO countries' support for the treaty and (?praised) Turkey for taking the decision not to deploy ground-to-ground missiles after the signing of the treaty.

Prc Peace Organization Welcomes INF Treaty
06171452 Hong Kong ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE in Chinese
1225 GMT 17 Dec 87

[Report: "China's Association for Peace and Disarmament Welcomes the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty"]

[Text] Beijing, 17 Dec (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE)—Peace and disarmament are not topics discussed and commented on only by Chinese officials. An increasing number of civilian organizations are showing their concern.

Today, the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, an organization comprising 21 influential mainland civilian organizations, including the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the All-China Youth Federation, and the All-China Women's Federation, held in Beijing a joint session among its member organizations. Ou Tangliang, a vice chairman of the association, at the session said that the Chinese people welcomed the INF Treaty recently signed by the U.S. and Soviet leaders.

This vice chairman added that the signing of the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty was only a beginning and that the road toward complete nuclear disarmament was undoubtedly long and arduous.

The Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament was founded in 1985. It has since established ties with 170 peace organizations in more than 40 countries. Last year, which was designated the International Year of Peace, the association received a "Messenger of Peace" award signed by the UN secretary general for its outstanding contributions.

Association Chairman Zhou Peiyuan indicated that the association will further expand its influence both at home and abroad.

Mixed European Reaction to INF Treaty
11181722 Beijing XINHUA in English
1655 GMT 18 Dec 87

["Round-up: INF Treaty Leaves Western Europe in a Quandary (by Yang Yuanhua)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, December 18 (XINHUA)—Nations in Western Europe are experiencing mixed feelings about the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty signed on December 8.

With the initial euphoria subsiding, they have begun to assess it in light of Western Europe's overall security strategy, and moves to beef up their own security.

The INF treaty is generally welcomed in Western Europe as a substantial breakthrough in the drawn-out arms control talks and the first superpowers' accord in post-war years to scrap a whole category of nuclear arsenals.

Europeans also are glad to see that the treaty accepts unbalanced nuclear reductions and verification measures which they see as a catalyst to arms control talks in other domains. And they view it as a thawing of tense East-West relations.

But how this subtle change in U.S.-Soviet relations brought about by the pull-out of medium-range nuclear missiles will affect Western Europe is now at the center of their re-thinking on the INF treaty.

First, Western Europe does not feel less threatened, because the Soviets enjoy an apparent superiority in conventional forces. According to Western estimates, the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces are two to three times those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Eastern bloc nations also hold a good lead in short-range nuclear weapons. Western Europeans fear that their strategy of nuclear deterrence based on military parity could be scrapped.

Leaders of Western European countries have warned that the dismantling of medium-range missiles does not mean "a realization of detente" nor "a halt of the arms race" which, in fact, has switched to a rivalry for higher quality and escalated to outer space.

The Federal German newspaper "DIE WELT" pointed out that what the Soviet Union gave up in the INF pact are superfluous warheads, rather than "its ability to threaten Western Europe." French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac cautioned recently that Western Europe is still threatened by massive armaments, and that an INF treaty will be a positive step only when an agreement to beef up European security is reached.

Secondly, Western Europe has been torn between the desire to see detente between the two superpowers and fear that its interests would be jeopardized as a result. In what they see as "overhead diplomacy," the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement in principle on scrapping medium-range missiles in Reykjavik last year. Europeans were bitter about that, feeling that they were left on the sidelines on a question directly geared to their security.

Federal German Chancellor Helmut Kohl recently reminded U.S. President Ronald Reagan that the interests of Western Europeans should not be overlooked. Emphasizing the point, Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher called for efforts by Western Europe to prevent East-West talks from being limited to the two superpowers.

"No protection for Europe" were the words the French newspaper "PARIS-JOURNAL" used to caption a cartoon showing the United States and the Soviet Union shaking hands firmly, with Europe sandwiched in between.

A "decoupling" of U.S., European defense is another fear lurking in some Western European nations. A weakened Western Europe after the Second World War has banked on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and stationed U.S. troops for its own security. The removal of medium-range missiles from Europe will certainly deepen the worry that the United States will someday dissociate itself from Europe.

It costs the United States 150 billion dollars annually for its commitments to NATO, accounting for some 47 percent of its total military outlay, and equalling the total

spent by all Western European nations. Appeals inside the United States for it to dissociate from Western Europe have been rising, and the recent agreement between the U.S. Congress and the White House to slash 75 billion dollars from the U.S. budget has increased concerns that the United States will sooner or later reduce or even forsake its commitments to the defense of Western Europe.

Finally, there is the misgiving that the INF treaty will deprive Western Europe's nuclear deterrence force of its medium- and shorter-range missiles, leaving it with only strategic and short-range rockets. Added to this fear is the possibility that future U.S.-Soviet nuclear talks may include short-range rockets, thus encroaching upon the independent nuclear force of Britain and France. In view of this, France and Britain have repeatedly stressed the independence of their nuclear weapons from any U.S.-Soviet nuclear deals. They have rejected the idea of European "denuclearization," which, they argue, would utterly neutralize their nuclear deterrence strategy.

The new situation has brought Western European leaders together on many occasions in an effort to work out a common strategy. Outstanding among the issues dealt with are the adoption by the seven member countries of the Western European Union of a "European security platform," which reaffirms conventional and nuclear forces as two fundamental props for Western Europe's security, upholds European-U.S. strategic links, and emphasizes the need for allied interests to be immune to any arms control moves. The document points up Western Europe's strong desire for defense cooperation and higher political standing. It also is the first such document in the post-war period with a strong European identification.

Within a week after the INF treaty was signed, France and Britain, the two nuclear states in Western Europe, decided to join hands in developing a new type of airborne nuclear missile and other measures designed to boost defense cooperation. The move was seen as aimed at fighting off the INF treaty's negative effects on Western Europe, and expressing discontent over the United States and the Soviet Union bossing about in European affairs.

There are signs that Western Europe's nuclear defense, which is based on French and British nuclear forces, and its conventional defense, which is based on Federal German and French forces, are making headway. More than a few countries have come up with concrete ideas for greater defense coordination. France and Federal Germany will set up a joint defense commission in January to study security prospects from a strategic angle.

Although some of the European measures are still in the offing, and, if they materialize, would be no match for the military forces of the United States and the Soviet

Union, they nevertheless mark a further awakening to the need of joint defense and the need to assert Western Europe's place in the world.

**Commentary on INF Repercussions, Continued
Space Rivalry**

06260250 Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese
18 Dec 87 p 4

["Yearender" by Washington-Based Staff Reporter Wang Deming (3769 1795 6900): "Relaxation Amid Confrontation—On U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1987"]

[Text] U.S.-Soviet relations in 1987 were characterized by the appearance of limited, unstable relaxation of tensions after the basic pattern of confrontation and dialogue. The treaty on medium-range missiles signed by U.S. and Soviet leaders on 8 December in Washington was the outcome of the two countries' attempt to carry out an overall arms race on the one hand and arrive at a partial compromise on the other. The new characteristic which has emerged in U.S.-Soviet relations and the change which will possibly take place in their prospects have drawn the attention of the world's people.

The signing of the treaty on medium-range missiles was a prominent event in U.S.-Soviet relations. The treaty was concluded in a situation in which both sides made a concession according to each of their needs. On the Soviet part, the Soviet Union is adjusting its foreign policy and military strategy following the shift of its domestic focus to economic reform. It is trying to relax its relations with foreign countries, to maintain a low-level balance of arms with the United States, to allow it to accelerate its development strategy, "to concentrate its efforts on economic construction, to tackle key problems in science and technology, and to catch up with the Western world in terms of comprehensive national strength. On the U.S. part, Reagan is, on the one hand, trying to weaken his opponent by proceeding from arms limitations talks; on the other, he is eager to strike a deal with the Soviet Union on the issue of medium-range missiles before his term of office ends, in an attempt to rehabilitate his reputation, which has suffered since the "Irangate" affair and to have himself seen by history as a "peace-loving president." Apart from this, he is also hoping to lend a helping hand to the Republican Party in next year's presidential election.

Medium-range missiles account for only 4 percent of the huge U.S. and Soviet arsenals. Fundamentally speaking, the destruction of all of the nuclear arms in this category will not affect the strategic balance of forces between the two sides. But after all, the agreement on the destruction of medium-range missiles represents relatively great progress in the prolonged deadlock of U.S.-Soviet arms limitations talks. To appraise the Washington summit meeting between the two leaders, U.S.-Soviet as well as East-West relations after the signing of the treaty on medium-range missiles and the influence of the treaty on the world situation are worth studying.

1. As indicated by the joint statement issued after the conclusion of the Washington summit meeting, the signing of the treaty on medium-range missiles will play a certain role in promoting arms control talks between the two countries. Both sides have made principled arrangements for the reduction of offensive strategic arms by 50 % and ordered their representatives to the Geneva talks to discuss the text of the agreement on the reduction of offensive strategic arms, which will be signed by leaders of the two countries when they meet in Moscow in the first half of next year. Viewed from the present situation, both sides still have serious differences on the deadline for reduction, on inspection and supervision, and, in particular, on the relationship of the anti-missile defense system. It can be predicted that U.S.-Soviet contention in arms control will become more intense and complicated.

2. U.S.-Soviet contention for the superiority in space arms is becoming white-hot. This involves the crucial question of who will maintain the long-term strategic initiative in war. At the Washington summit, the two leaders still could not eliminate their serious differences on whether the testing, development, and deployment of arms listed in the SDI (that is, the "Star Wars plan") can be carried out within the framework of the 1972 anti-Ballistic Missiles [ABM] Treaty. The joint statement only mentions in general terms that both sides agree to abide by the ABM Treaty and that they will "act" according to the treaty. But it does not explain the treaty in a narrow or broad sense. Thus both sides can make their own explanations. Undoubtedly, the United States and the Soviet Union will engage in an all-round confrontation characterized by imposing and opposing restrictions on the issue of space arms. Both sides will conclude some deals on the reduction of nuclear arms, but their effort to improve the quality of nuclear arms cannot be altered. The U.S.-Soviet arms race has entered a new period of quantitative reduction and qualitative improvement.

3. A delicate change will possibly take place in relations between the United States and Western Europe and between the Soviet Union and the continent. The treaty on medium-range missiles conforms to West European demand for lowering the level of East-West nuclear armament and relaxing East-West relations. But to a certain extent, Western Europe has lost the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Viewed from the development of the situation, the Atlantic alliance which protects the fundamental benefits of the United States and Europe will not crumble, but relations on defense between the United States and Europe will become lax. Western Europe will strengthen their independence and integration in the fields of politics and defense.

4. Limited relaxation will appear in U.S.-Soviet relations, but there are still many unstable factors, and the nature of confrontation cannot be altered. The call for improvement in relations is mounting in both the United States and the Soviet Union, and a period will

come in which the two countries will increase their contacts and exchanges. However, the long-term strategic targets of the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to contradict each other, one "aiming at a limited retreat strategy" and the other "stubbornly persisting in the position already obtained." The basic situation in their strategic contention will remain unchanged. The relaxation which has appeared is limited, there are still many unstable factors.

What should be stressed is this: None of the regional clashes in the world today has ever been resolved. Not only will the crises in these regions impact on U.S.-Soviet relations and the situation in their arms race, they will also aggravate international tension and bring about a change in the world situation. While taking an interest in the limited relaxation in the relations between the two superpowers, international opinion should also maintain a high degree of vigilance against them.

Commentary on Post-INF Atmosphere, Space Superiority Issue

06211355 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
20 Dec 87 p 7

[Article by Liu Shuiming (0491 3055 2494): "What Will Come After the Gun Salute?"]

[Text] A white building on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington became the focus of world attention from 8 to 10 December 1987. After a gun salute, U.S. and Soviet leaders signed a treaty on medium-range missiles in the East Room of the magnificent White House on the afternoon of 8 December.

This event was a front-page lead in newspapers during those days. Reagan and Gorbachev seemed to have brought "glad tidings" overnight to those who were looking forward to Christmas. The event aroused strong repercussions in press circles throughout the world. Comments were optimistic, but there were also different views, of course. During the stir, varying opinions made people recall the ancient fairy tale of the "worry-forgetting fruit."

The story of the "worry-forgetting fruit," which comes from the Greek epic "The Odyssey," says that when one eats the fruit, one will immediately forget the past and all misgivings.

The United States and Soviet Union finally came to an agreement on medium-range missiles after a long course of fierce bargaining and setbacks. Beaming with smiles, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF treaty. This really made many people heave a sigh of relief. Some of these people forgot the past and their misgivings as if they had eaten the "worry-forgetting fruit." However, we cannot yet say that the whole world has become an "alliance of people who have forgotten their misgivings," because

many people who have endured much suffering under a nuclear threat for long years find it difficult to dispel the misgivings that keep surging in their minds.

As the first treaty that not only limits and but also reduces nuclear armaments since atom bombs came into being, the INF treaty merits a welcome. But why are many people not willing to take the treaty as the "worry-forgetting fruit"? Articles and data published in newspapers and magazines in many countries incontrovertibly remind people that the signing of the INF treaty does not in the least indicate a large-scale decrease in the danger of nuclear war.

How can people overlook the "Star Wars" plan in which the United States is persisting, or overlook its "lofty ideal" of setting up its strategic superiority by developing space arms? Unwilling to fall behind, is the Soviet Union not engaged in research on space-based weapons against missile attacks? There are indications that U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament will give rise to this situation: The quantity is decreasing, but the quality is improving; they are conducting disarmament on the one hand and manufacturing more weapons on the other; and the deployment of space arms will continue in spite of the reduction of ground weapons. Therefore, although the INF treaty will bring about a climate different from that of the cold wars, how can people of insight dispel their worry about the prospects, which are full of uneasiness?

An unprecedentedly warm atmosphere appeared in the relations between the two countries prior to the meeting of the two leaders, but the following occurrence gives people much food for thought: Before the signing of the INF treaty, Reagan presented Gorbachev with a pair of pure gold cufflinks engraved with the image of the Prophet Isaiah casting a sword into a plowshare. This gift, which implies far-reaching significance, is undoubtedly regarded as a symbol of turning hostility into friendship. However, before the ink on the just-signed treaty was dry and when Gorbachev had just bidden farewell to the United States, the U.S. Navy, "out of political consideration," launched ahead of schedule a Trident-2 intercontinental missile on 11 December. The Soviet Union deemed it necessary to "show a similar courtesy" for the the United States, and therefore conducted an underground nuclear test near Semipalatinsk in the Kazak Republic on 13 December. Although the two tests were not forbidden by the treaty, the solemn ceremony welcoming the Soviet leader with a roaring gun salute on the lawn of the White House was substituted by a "lightening and thunderbolt" in the West and an "earthquake" in the East within a short span of hours. Did this conform to the atmosphere in the White House in which Reagan and Gorbachev were as affectionate as a "pair of peace pigeons"? May the signing of the treaty be not just an expedient measure, but a true beginning for their gradual advance toward total disarmament. May it stand the test of history.

The people of the world did not swallow the "worry-forgetting fruit," in spite of the fact that they are anxious for peace and happiness. They did not just hear the roaring gun salute on the lawn of the White House, but also understand this simple truth: Harmony needs the goodwill of both sides, while war generally breaks out due to the vicious intent of one side. They will make unswerving efforts until the terrible shadows of nuclear weapons over their heads disappear.

'Yearender' on INF Treaty, WEU Defense
06291540 Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese
20 Dec 87 p 3

["Yearender" by Jia Bin (6328 2430): "The Medium-Range Missile Treaty and Defense of Western Europe"]

[Text] Through many twists and turns the official U.S.-Soviet treaty on eliminating all medium- and short-range missiles was eventually signed in Washington. According to this treaty the United States will eliminate 859 medium- and short-range missiles, and 429 of these missiles are deployed in Western Europe as a component part of the region's defense forces. So the signing of the INF treaty certainly aroused close attention from West European countries, and evoked strong repercussions among them.

West European opinion generally held that the INF treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union is the "first real disarmament agreement." The withdrawal and elimination of American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in intense confrontation, which will be guaranteed by strict inspection and verification measures, will undoubtedly be favorable to easing the European and world situation, and will create favorable conditions for further disarmament in the future. So the treaty was welcomed.

However, the withdrawal and elimination of the medium-range missiles will also bring about some serious problems in West European defense: First, will the "nuclear deterrent" strategy continue to be valid? Over the past decades West European defense has always been based on "nuclear deterrence," and the American medium-range missiles, which could be fired from Western Europe into Soviet territory, constituted a main nuclear deterrent force. Without such missiles, nuclear deterrence will be greatly weakened. Second, will Europe take the "non-nuclear" road? Both the United States and the Soviet Union have indicated that their objective is to realize their "non-nuclear" target. The INF treaty embodied a major breakthrough and all short-range missiles, as well as the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France, will gradually be eliminated. As a result, a Western Europe without nuclear weapons will have to face a Soviet Union with strong conventional forces, and will thus lose its self-defense ability. Third, will the United States shake off its commitment in Western Europe? At present, the United States spends \$120 to \$130 billion a year on its troops stationed in

Western Europe and on their military equipment. This accounts for one-third of the total military expenditure by the United States. Some people in the United States often call for withdrawal of the troops, and the elimination of medium-range missiles has increased this possibility.

Aside from the abovementioned concerns, West European opinion also expressed discontent with the fact that the U.S. and Soviet leaders discussed European security without the participation of European nations, and called this "top-transcending diplomacy." Many people in Western Europe even compared the recent U.S.-Soviet summit meeting to the "Yalta Conference" in which the United States and the Soviet Union secretly divided up the world near the end of World War II.

When facing this situation, the West European countries unanimously agreed that they should strengthen their own defense and cooperation, and should gradually shift the defense strategy to conventional warfare. First of all, France and the FRG have obviously strengthened their military cooperation. Not long ago, the French president proposed that the two countries set up a joint defense committee, and the FRG chancellor also proposed that the two countries organize combined combat brigades of mixed troops from the two countries. In September this year, French and West German troops carried out the largest joint military exercise in the postwar period involving a total of 70,000 to 80,000 troops from the two countries. The French president and the West German chancellor were present in the exercise area, and the defense ministers from the two countries personally supervised the war games. In addition, the two countries have also formulated concrete cooperation plans for producing weapons, making helicopters, and developing space technology. On 12 December, 4 days after the official signing of the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty, French Prime Minister Chirac openly announced: "If the FRG was invaded, France would immediately join the defensive battle without reservation." This was the first time a French leader made such a promise so explicitly. The FRG Government immediately issued a statement welcoming the French statement. Obviously, military cooperation between France and West Germany will become a major force in West European defense. Second, Britain, which maintains special traditional relations with the United States, recently adopted some special measures to strengthen its military relations with France and West Germany. Britain and France are the only two West European countries that possess their own nuclear weapons, and they share many common points in their defense policies. Over the past year, the heads of government and defense ministers of the two countries have frequently held meetings and talks. They have decided to strengthen cooperation in developing the military industry and nuclear technology. On 14 December the British and French defense ministers once again met in London and decided to join forces in developing a kind of air-to-surface missile which can be fired by fighters and carry nuclear warheads. Britain has troops stationed in

West Germany and also has a commitment for its defense. So as France, Britain, and the FRG strengthen their relations, they may form a backbone force in West European defense. Third, the West European countries have also strengthened multilateral defense cooperation. The seven-nation military organization—Western European Union—has become active again since 1984, and has put forward many proposals for West European proposals. Not long ago the defense and foreign ministers of the member countries of this organization held a meeting in The Hague to formulate the "European Security Program." Parliamentarians from the seven member countries have also held regular meetings in Paris to discuss military and defense issues. All the abovementioned are important steps taken by West European countries for their common defense.

Of course due to their different positions and conditions, the West European countries inevitably have differences in their defense notions. The FRG is a member of NATO so it depends more on the United States for its defense; while France is not a member of NATO and is pursuing an independent defense policy. France resolutely opposes the European non-nuclear orientation; but the FRG is more inclined to the notion of eliminating all nuclear weapons in Europe, because it is directly faced with the nuclear threat. In addition, Britain also has misgivings about close military cooperation with France,

and Italy more obviously indicates that it does not agree with the "leadership core" formed by France and West Germany in West European defense. Such contradictions and differences also find expression in other events, such as the failure of the recent European Community summit in Copenhagen. It seems that West European defense cooperation remains a long-term target. However, the signing of the U.S.-Soviet INF treaty has greatly advanced this process.

Rogachev Briefs Qichen on USSR-U.S. Summit
1121115Z Beijing XINHUA in English
1137 GMT 21 Dec 87

[Text] Beijing, December 22 (XINHUA)—A special envoy of the Soviet leadership, E.A. Rogachev, briefed here today Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on the USSR-U.S. summit meeting.

Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian met Rogachev who is vice-foreign minister of the Soviet Union.

Rogachev arrived yesterday and was honored at a dinner hosted by Qian.

V.P. Fedotov, Soviet charge d'affaires in Beijing, attended the dinner and briefing sessions.

JAPAN

Nagasaki Protests French Nuclear Test in Pacific
52600004 Tokyo KYODO in English
0603 GMT 25 Oct 87

[Text] Nagasaki, 25 Oct KYODO—Nagasaki city office and assembly Sunday jointly protested to France for its nuclear weapons test in the South Pacific Saturday.

In a cable to the French embassy the city office and assembly said France should immediately halt nuclear weapons experiments, which they said, could accelerate the nuclear arms race and the further development of nuclear weapons.

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**Soviet Committee for European Security,
Cooperation Chronicle**

*52001020a Moscow SOVETSKIY KOMITET ZA
YEVRPEYSKUYU BEZOPASNOST I
SOTRUDNICHESTVO: INFORMATSIONNYY
BYULLETEN in Russian No 42-43, Aug 87 pp 31-34*

[Text] Chronicle

—17-25 August 1986: a delegation of prominent representatives of the Free Democratic Party (FRG) headed by Bundestag Deputy O. Feldman visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—8-14 September 1986: political advisers J.M. Virsma and V.J. van den Boomen from the Central Administration of the Labor Party of the Netherlands visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—22-24 September 1986: the 10th session of the working group "Economic East-West Interrelationships in Europe" dedicated to the theme "Process of Decision-Making and Formulation of Policy in the Economy at the Macro and Micro-Levels" was held in Florence (Italy). The session was organized by the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, the Italian Association for the Comparative Study of Economic Systems and the International Research Foundation in Florence. Scientists and representatives of business circles from 13 countries took part in the meeting. Academician O.T. Bogomolov, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and director of the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, participated in the session.

—24-28 September 1986: a delegation of the "Alerdink Foundation" (the Netherlands) headed by foundation president Franz Lurfink visited Moscow. The delegation took part in a meeting of managers of the mass media of the East and West.

—26 September-3 October 1986: a delegation of the Italian organization "Disarmament Archives" headed by Senator Luigi Anderlini visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—15-17 September 1986: The International Conference on European Security Problems organized by the Hamburg International Institute for Politics and Economics was held in Hamburg (FRG). A delegation from the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation composed of V.B. Lomeyko, special ambassador of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Maj Gen G.V. Batenin, expert in the USSR Ministry of Defense; and YU.V. Andreyev, deputy director of the Center for West

European Studies of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part in the conference.

—4-5 November 1986: while visiting Finland, a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation headed by L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet, held meetings and talks with leaders of the Finnish National Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—11-14 November 1986: a delegation of the leadership of the "Greens" Party of the FRG visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation: A.M. Borgman, cochairman of the parliamentary group of the "Greens" in the Bundestag and deputy to the Bundestag; J. Dittfurt and L. Beckman, cochairmen of the managing board of the "Greens" Party; N. Kostede, member of the managing board of the "Greens" Party; O. Scheely, expert in the parliamentary group of the "Greens" Party; and F. Stenner, "Greens" Party expert on matters involving the press.

The delegation was received by A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze; A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and N.F. Lukonin, USSR Minister for Nuclear Power.

There were meetings and talks in the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the association Tekhsnabeksport, the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

The delegation held press conferences in Moscow and Bonn on the results of its visit in the USSR.

—30 November-6 December 1986: a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation visited the GDR at the invitation of the National Committee for European Security and Cooperation. It was composed of V.D. Yezhov, sector head of the Marxism-Leninism Institute under the CPSU Central Committee; V.N. Shenayev, director of the Center for West European Studies of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; A.M. Kokeyev, senior researcher of the World Economics and International Trade Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and committee secretary G.P. Baranovskiy.

—8-15 February 1987: representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation A.Ya. Sukharev, president of the Association of Soviet Jurists and Minister of Justice of the RSFSR, and Prof T.F. Tairov, acting sector head of the World Economics

and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, met in Vienna (Austria) with representatives of delegations from the countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

—19-24 February 1987: an international symposium was held in West Berlin, in which a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation composed of Ye.Ye. Grigoryev, deputy to the chief editor of the newspaper PRAVDA, and Yu.V. Andreyev, deputy director of the Center for West European Studies of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part.

—Representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, A.Ya. Sukharev, president of the Association of Soviet Jurists and Minister of Justice of the RSFSR, and Prof T.F. Tairov, acting sector head of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part in the 43rd Session of the UN Human Rights Commission (Geneva, Switzerland).

—18-21 March 1987: a "round table meeting" organized by the Rhine-Westphalia Foreign Society was held in Dortmund. Participating in the meeting held under the motto "Europe on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: Stopping the Destruction of Nature" were representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, secretaries of the board of the USSR Union of Writers F.F. Kuznetsov and A.A. Mikhaylov, writers T.A. Kudryavtseva and V.F. Ognev, and Central Television reviewer G.I. Zubkov.

—25 March-2 April 1987: a delegation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation composed of F.M. Burlatskiy, political observer for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, committee secretary Ye.M. Yuryev, and V.P. Gayduk, scientific associate of the General History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, participated in the Italian-Soviet meeting of representatives of culture, science and the public on the subject "Peace on the Threshold of the 21st Century." The delegation was received by Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Andreotti and there were meetings and talks with members of the leadership of the Christian Democratic Party G. Orlando, head of the international section of the Christian Democratic Party, and A. Kabraso, director of the newspaper POPOLO.

—7-9 April 1987: Dr of Historical Sciences L.S. Voronkov, representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and leading researcher of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, took part as an observer in the work of the regular congress of the Socialist Left Party of Norway held in Oslo.

—20-25 April 1987: a delegation of the leadership of the Movement of Leftwing Radicals of France headed by movement chairman Senator Francois Duben visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—3-9 May 1987: V.S. Vinogradov, member of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and department head at Moscow State University imeni Lomonosov, took part in a "round table" meeting on problems of security in Europe held in Madrid (Spain).

—11 May 1987: the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation received representatives of the Christian People's Party of Norway headed by the chairman of its parliamentary group H. Syunnes.

—15-17 May 1987: Prof D.G. Tomashevskiy, representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and leading researcher of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, participated in the congress of the organization "Alliance for Peace" of the Province of Quebec held in Montreal (Canada).

—15 May 1987: the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation talked with a delegation of the leadership of Socialist Youth of Austria headed by its chairman Peter Kaiser. The delegation visited Moscow at the invitation of the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR.

—22-24 May 1987: an international conference on problems of international security and confidence-building measures was held in Lolkum (FRG). Representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation participated in the conference: O.A. Grinevskiy, special ambassador of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Yu.V. Andreyev, deputy director of the Center for West European Studies of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V.Ye. Bashkirov, expert with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs; V.V. Ivanov, lecturer at the Moscow Spiritual Academy; and committee consultant V.I. Vasilyev.

—24-27 May 1987: a delegation of the Hans Seidel Foundation close to the Christain Social Union (FRG) visited Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. The delegation was made up of O. Wishau, deputy to the Bavarian land parliament, and D. Schmidt, director of the foundation's International Relations Institute. The guests were received by L.N. Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Meetings and talks were held in the World Economics and International Relations Institute and the United States of American and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in the course of which there was discussion of current questions in international politics in Europe and the world and of ways to strengthen

security, cooperation and confidence on the European continent. The interlocutors demonstrated great interest in different aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR and of the restructuring taking place in the country. They discussed proposals for the further development of dialogue between the Hans Seidel Foundation and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

—28 May 1987: an international forum on the theme "The Risk of War and Hopes for Peace" was held in Copenhagen (Denmark). Representatives of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation participated in the work of the forum: V.A. Babak, sector head of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, honored actor of the RSFSR Leonid Chizhik, and the bishop of Vladimir and Suzdal.

—28-31 May 1987: an international symposium organized by the West Berlin Political Club for European Cooperation was held in Helsinki (Finland). V.M. Shastitko, deputy director of the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, took part in the symposium.

—30-31 May 1987: an international conference on the theme "Relations of World Powers and Their Impact in the Area of the Stability of the Military and Political Balance and Disarmament in Europe" was held in Boston (United States of America). Representatives of the scientific public, diplomats and journalists participated in the conference organized by the West Berlin Political Club for European Cooperation. V.I. Mikhaylov, outside correspondent of the newspaper PRAVDA and representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, took part in the conference.

—1-10 June 1987: the inter-university center in Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) held an international conference and course of study on the theme "Conflicts in the International System: from War to Mutual Understanding." Dr of Historical Sciences A.I. Utkin, leading researcher of the United States and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and representative of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, took part in these measures.

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U.S. Space Goals Attacked

18160001b Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 9, Sep 87 (signed to press 17 Aug 87) pp 3-11

[Article by Yu. Tomilin: "Space: Confrontation or Cooperation?"]

[Text] The problem of preventing an arms race in space has come to the forefront of world politics. Whether space becomes the test range for the "shooting up" of the Earth or a sphere of peaceful cooperation in the interests of all states depends on its solution.

The "Strategic Defense Initiative" represents an ugly result of the S&T revolution. Precisely at a time when the conquest of near-Earth space has entered the period of maturity and could return a hundredfold the resources spent on it a plan has appeared whose realization is dangerously altering the system of priorities of S&T progress.

I

The SDI represents a program geared to the development and deployment—at several successive frontiers—of space- and ground-based facilities with which American strategists contemplate the destruction of launched enemy missiles.

The special group of 10 Pentagon contractor corporations under the leadership of the SDI Organization has studied alternative versions of the system incorporating initially 4, then, 5, 6 and now 7 echelons of the deployment of space-based assault arms (they are called in the United States "stories" and tiers). Calculations for the initial deployment of "star wars" systems have already been made. Some 3,200 operational space platforms could appear in space, according to American press information, as a result of the first stage, and it is contemplated spending approximately \$1 trillion on the implementation of plans for a space-based assault arms race. However, merely the annual maintenance of the SDI would cost \$100-200 billion, which corresponds to roughly to one-half of the United States' present military budget.

The main point being stressed by the U.S. Administration is the "defensive nature" of the system which is being developed. President R. Reagan has declared that it is intended for "destroying weapons, not people." At the same time a global space-based ABM intercept system could also, according to authoritative specialists, American included, be used as an offensive weapon for attacking ground-, air- and sea-based targets from space. The detection, guidance and kill technology being developed in the United States is perfectly applicable for offense.

An ABM system makes sense if it provides 100 percent-assured cover for a country's territory. Even a small proportion of the stockpiled nuclear weapons which breached an enemy's ABM defenses would cause the other side unacceptable damage. Is an "absolute" ABM system possible?

The history of the development of military technology shows that there are no nor can there be absolute defensive weapons. The development of offensive and defensive weapons has always been a single process. The appearance of new types of defense stimulates the opposite side to speed up the creation of ways of overcoming it.

In the course of the debate which has developed in connection with the space-based ABM program American specialists themselves are citing dozens of weapons and methods which could render this system ineffective. Here are just some of them: destruction of the ABM space stations by ground-, sea-, air- or space-based ballistic missiles; destruction of these stations with the aid of ground-based lasers of great strength; creation on the trajectory of the stations of obstacles moving such that their relative velocity is sufficient to put the stations out of action; decoy launchings of missiles, to hit which the ABM space stations would expend reserves of energy; applying to the missiles mirror protection deflecting the laser beam; disrupting radio communications between the space system and the ground control station.

In citing these and a number of other weapons and methods of getting the better of space-based ABM systems American specialists confirm that their creation and application would cost considerably less than deployment of the system itself. It is believed that expenditure on the means of negotiating the defenses would constitute 1-2 percent of the expenditure on the ABM defenses.

It is not the first time that the question of the creation of an ABM system for the United States has arisen. It was a topic of discussion throughout the 1960's, when the military-industrial complex attempted to advance initially the Sentinel and subsequently the Safeguard systems. As now also, the supporters of the ABM system speculated extensively on the psychological attractiveness of the very idea of defense against nuclear weapons. However, deployment was categorically opposed by R. McNamara, who was at that time (1961-1968) U.S. defense secretary, a number of prominent senators (W. Fulbright, M. Mansfield, F. Church, S. Symington, C. Percy) and also most authoritative strategic arms experts (G. York, [Dzh. Vizner] and G. Ratzhens).

It is significant that the same arguments were put forward against the ABM system as are prominent now also. The destabilizing role of so-called "defensive" arms was emphasized primarily. The huge potential cost of any version was pointed out also. The sum of \$40-50 million was cited at that time as the maximum figure for the most dependable system. In terms of the present day, when the approximate cost of a space-based ABM system has passed the \$1 trillion mark, these amounts appear relatively modest. Finally, its opponents sharply criticized both above-mentioned projects from the viewpoint of their military vulnerability also. In a speech to the editors and proprietors of UPI in San Francisco on 18 September 1967 R. McNamara reached the following conclusion: "It is important to understand that no ABM system which exists at the present time or in the foreseeable future will ensure the creation of an impenetrable shield over the United States."

On 26 May 1972 the United States agreed to the conclusion with the Soviet Union of the Treaty Limiting ABM

Systems and thereby renounced the creation of a broad-based ABM system. The present U.S. leaders prefer not to recall this page of history.

Finally, upon examination of the proposition concerning the "defensive" nature of the SDI the conceptual interconnection between offensive and defensive arms cannot be ignored either. It was recognized both by the United States and the Soviet Union back in 1972. The Soviet-American Treaty Limiting ABM Systems says: "...Effective measures to limit ABM systems would be an essential factor in curbing the strategic offensive arms race and would lead to a lessening of the danger of the outbreak of wars involving the use of nuclear weapons." And the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the United States on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms emphasizes plainly that the parties take into consideration "the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive arms." And the very fact of the simultaneous conclusion of the two agreements is sufficiently eloquent testimony to such an interconnection.

Currently the American "star wars" supporters are trying to portray matters such that the situation changes fundamentally in connection with the appearance of new technical possibilities. In actual fact the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive systems exists objectively and is for this reason of a permanent nature. Nor does it disappear, of course, with the appearance of the possibility of the creation of technically more accomplished and efficient ABM systems. The 1972 Soviet-American treaty was concluded on precisely this basis. It banned not some specific systems developed in the 1960's but the creation of ABM systems in principle. It was for this reason that the treaty included the provision concerning its permanency (article XV).

The point being that the general correlation of forces between the sides is determined with regard for both offensive and defensive types of arms. If, given military-strategic parity, one side should acquire a defensive system capable of neutralizing, say, 50 percent of the strategic weapons of the other side, parity would clearly be disturbed. The side which had created such a defensive system would acquire twofold superiority in strategic weapons.

To restore the disturbed parity the other side would be forced to increase its strategic power either by way of a direct buildup of its offensive forces or by supplementing them with defensive weapons. In any event, all this would lead to a further arms race, raising it to an increasingly high qualitative and quantitative level.

II

The "Strategic Defense Initiative" is being heralded as a resource which will make nuclear weapons "obsolete and unnecessary." The SDI is thereby being ascribed the role virtually of the savior of mankind from the nuclear

threat. However, while declaring that the creation of ABM defenses will lead to the "withering away" of nuclear weapons the U.S. Administration is continuing to implement at an accelerated pace programs of an increase in all components of its strategic triad, ballistic missiles primarily. New types of strategic offensive arms are being developed simultaneously.

Their creation is based over many years ahead—at least through the end of the millennium. What is the point of spending billion-dollar sums on arms, which, as the authors of the SDI maintain, will become "obsolete and unnecessary"? It would be far more intelligent to negotiate right now a reduction in nuclear arms. The nuclear threat would then be reduced, and huge material resources could be used for creative purposes.

At one time nuclear weapons were also presented as an alternative to conventional arms. However, the creation of tremendous nuclear arsenals has by no means reduced the role of conventional arms. On the contrary, these arms continue to be increased and upgraded, to which, for example, the "Rogers Plan" testifies. Finally, if there is the possibility of if only some nuclear missiles breaching ABM defenses, this will only spur the nuclear arms race.

The destabilizing role of ABM defenses would show up in all instances. Of course, a situation wherein one side, having created ABM defenses, disrupted the strategic parity would be the most dangerous. Such an argument is, incidentally, purely speculative. In practice the other side would, of course, adopt retaliatory measures either by way of an increase in offensive weapons or the creation of defensive ones. Parity would be maintained. But it would be even more fragile, and computation of the correlation of military potentials would be more complicated. There would be increased uncertainty in the evaluation of the forces of the opposite side and an increased likelihood of miscalculations, each of which could be fatal.

As far as the role of "deterrence" is concerned, the assertion concerning the need therefor in respect of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries is contrived since the unleashing of war is contrary to the fundamental principles of their foreign policy. Further, in the arguments of the defenders of the "strategic initiative" concerning the "deterrent" role of the SDI the ends do not meet: on the one hand it is seemingly intended that the two opposite sides—both the United States and the USSR—should possess all-embracing ABM systems for the promised "stabilizing effect" to be obtained (President R. Reagan even mentioned somehow the possibility of the Soviet Union being granted the necessary technical information concerning a space-based ABM defense).

At the same time, however, U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger believes that the situation would be "stable" if just the United States possesses such a system. Finally,

neither the bilateral nor unilateral creation of ABM defenses would in any way be reflected in the correlation of forces in the sphere of conventional arms and, consequently, would not lead to a change in the position of Washington, which justifies the permissibility of delivering a nuclear first strike by the fact that the USSR allegedly has superiority in conventional arms.

The U.S. Administration maintains that the work on realization of the SDI is of a "research" nature and is not for this reason contrary to the 1972 treaty.

Yet the mere formulation of the question of the deployment of a space-based ABM system manifestly testifies to an intention to violate the 1972 treaty. Washington has advanced as cover the so-called "broad interpretation" of the treaty, according to which it is maintained that it permits the creation and testing of ABM systems or components thereof of any type of basing, space included, if they are based on "different physical principles" to those which existed in 1972.

The administration's attempts to put into circulation and legalize the "broad interpretation" of the treaty has given rise to sharp criticism in Congress and the public and political circles of the country. In March 1987 S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, presented the report "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty" analyzing the general meaning and individual provisions of the document. The report's main conclusion was that the new, "broad" meaning completely contradicts the understanding of the treaty by Congress and the Executive at the time of its ratification. The report emphasizes that if a practice whereby this president or the other may interpret agreements signed by his predecessors as he sees fit is accepted, it would be altogether impossible for the United States to subscribe to any international treaties.

In Reykjavik the Soviet Union proposed that both sides undertake for a period of 10 years not to avail themselves of their right to withdraw from the treaty. The testing of ABM components in space would throughout this period remain prohibited, as the treaty requires. Such a prohibition would not extend, however, to research and tests conducted within a laboratory framework, that is, scientific research on the ground—in institutes and at test ranges and plants. In addition, for the purpose of removing disagreements concerning the boundary which cannot be crossed in the research, engineering and testing of facilities of an ABM defense the Soviet Union proposed to the United States the coordination of the list of the devices which would not be put into space in the course of the research.

The main purpose of the SDI, however it is camouflaged, is with its help to achieve military superiority to the Soviet Union. The "star wars" program—despite all its seeming novelty—essentially amounts to a routine attempt by U.S. ruling circles to achieve "absolute security" for themselves while having put all others in a

position of "absolute danger." What it has not for decades been possible to achieve with the aid of increasingly new twists of the nuclear arms race spiral on Earth it is now intended obtaining by way of the use of the latest space technology.

III

The Soviet Union consistently advocates outer space serving the progress of mankind and being excluded for all time from the sphere of military activity. Following the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite the USSR proposed in a memorandum on disarmament issues of 15 March 1958 a specific program for prevention of the militarization of space providing for a ban on all types of military use thereof without exception, including the use of ICBM's.

The Treaty on the Principles of States' Activity Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was concluded in 1967 to a considerable extent as a result of the Soviet Union's efforts. More than 80 states subscribe to it currently. The treaty contains together with a broad range of principles of a general nature regulating states' activity pertaining to the exploration and use of space provisions pertaining to a partial ban on an arms race in space and also to the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies solely for peaceful purposes. Most material are states' undertakings not to put into circumterrestrial orbit any facilities containing nuclear or other types of weapon of mass extermination, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to deploy them in outer space in any other manner and also the ban on the creation on celestial bodies of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any types of weapons and military maneuvers.

In 1981 the Soviet Union presented the initiative pertaining to the conclusion of a treaty banning in outer space weapons of any kind. In 1983 it proposed further progress and the negotiation of a ban on the use of force both in outer space and from space in relation to the Earth. The USSR believes possible agreement also on partial measures aimed at preventing the deployment of weapons in space. For example, the elaboration of an international agreement on the assured immunity of artificial Earth satellites could be embarked upon. A search for an opportunity to ban the creation of new and to eliminate existing ASAT systems would be important also.

The conclusion of a multilateral agreement containing assurances in international law of the inviolability of space objects would contribute to the development of trust between states and a strengthening of security and strategic stability. The withdrawal from states' arsenals of the ASAT weapons which already exist and also the renunciation of the testing and creation of new systems

of such weapons would be a practicable disarmament measure maintaining the existing military balance and corresponding to the demands of the principle of equality and equal security.

In 1986 the Geneva Conference on Disarmament actively discussed the question of definition of space-based assault arms. The Soviet delegation proposed the incorporation here of space-based ABM facilities of any operational principle; space-based weapons of any operational principle designed for the destruction from space of targets in the terrestrial atmosphere or on the Earth's surface; weapons of all types of basing of any operational principle intended for destroying space facilities.

In order to shift discussion of the question of preventing an arms race in space from a position of standstill right now the USSR is proposing examination of the possibility of the creation of a system of international supervision of the prevention of the deployment there of weapons of any kind, which envisages the establishment of an international inspectorate. The latter would be accorded right of access—for the purpose of on-site inspection—to all facilities intended for guidance into and deployment in outer space and to the corresponding guidance systems. All space object launches could be carried out under the observation of the inspectors. This proposal confirms the fact that for the Soviet Union the problem of verification would not be an obstacle were it a question of the real prevention of the arms race moving into space.

At the Conference on Disarmament in February 1987 the Soviet delegation put forward the proposal concerning the adoption of measures to prohibit "space to space," "space to earth" and "earth to space" weapons class systems. A special letter from N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the UN secretary general in June 1986 developed a program of practical action pertaining to the organization of international cooperation in the conquest of outer space. It is of a comprehensive nature and constructed such as to take into consideration the interests of all states—from the leading space states to those for whom possibilities connected with the conquest of space are only just opening up. Of course, the organization of multilateral international cooperation in space is a highly complex process, and it should be realized in well conceived and gradual manner.

At the first stage of a duration of approximately 5 years it would be expedient to study peoples' requirements concerning the use of space equipment, taking into consideration both the current state thereof and development prospects. The logical culmination of this stage could be the convening of an international conference or a special UN General Assembly session on space issues or some other suitable forum, which could approve an action program for the 1990's with a view to the subsequent 10-15 years and examine the question of the

establishment of a world space organization—an all-purpose interstate organization with its own charter in the form of an international treaty.

The main tasks which it would tackle would be the coordination of cooperation programs and projects in various spheres of cosmonautics; the most rational expenditure of the resources allocated for space conquest purposes; actual assistance to states when necessary. The range of possible actions is extraordinarily wide: from space communications, navigation and long-distance exploration of the Earth through the creation of new energy sources, the development of new materials and technology and the organization of production in space. Finally, the organization could as agreements on prevention of the spread of the arms race to space are concluded monitor compliance therewith also.

It would be fair for the main resources for international projects under the aegis of a world space organization to be allocated primarily by the space powers and other economically developed countries. The developing states could participate in the projects on preferential terms, and the least developed countries, obtain the scientific and technical results of the efforts by way of assistance for development purposes.

The development and creation of space equipment for realization of the above-mentioned international projects could be embarked upon at the second stage of the program proposed by the USSR. Of course, it would be advisable initially to concentrate forces in the priority spheres like, for example, global study of the Earth's biosphere for the elaboration and implementation of measures to preserve it. The world space organization would begin its activity with the coordination of national plans for space conquest, the organization of a broad exchange of the results of space activity and assistance to countries taking the first steps in the use of space.

The third stage, geared to the final 5-year period of the 20th century, proposes realization of the projects which have been started, practical returns therefrom and the laying of the material basis for the further development of international cooperation. It would then be possible to embark on the accomplishment of more large-scale tasks such as the creation of space equipment for transition in the first decades of the 21st century even to the planned conquest and use of the Moon, specifically as a base for flights to other planets.

The Soviet program is a call for cooperation addressed to all states without exception. The basis thereof is the profound belief that the development of wide-ranging international cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space is a constructive alternative to the plans to extend the arms race to near-Earth space.

It was this approach which permeated the proposal made by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to India concerning the creation with the assistance of the leading space

powers of an international center for joint R&D pertaining to orders of the developing countries for models of space equipment. A school for training specialists from these countries, including cosmonauts, and also a range for the launching of space objects would function under the auspices of the center.

The USSR has declared its readiness to exchange achievements in the conquest of space with all states and to launch peaceful spacecraft of other countries and international organizations with their carrier rockets on mutually acceptable terms. The USSR is prepared to make considerable benefits available when putting spacecraft into orbit for the developing countries.

The Soviet Union has several types of carriers and, consequently, could put into orbit the most diverse spacecraft. Specialists believe that the "Proton" rocket is the most promising. There are other types of rockets also, specifically the three-stage "Soyuz" and small single-stage "Vertikal" fitted with a reusable equipment container. These carriers also have given a good account of themselves in the practice of space activity.

In replies to questions from TASS correspondents in January 1987 N.I. Ryzhkov declared that Soviet state authorities would grant clients the necessary assurances of the safekeeping of their spacecraft while on the territory of the USSR—from the moment it crossed the border right up until launch. The Soviet Union is prepared to exempt apparatus intended for launch from customs inspection and authorize its transportation over USSR territory and delivery to the cosmodrome in a sealed container if such is convenient for the client. Foreign specialists will be able accompany their spacecraft and be present during its transportation and installation on the carrier rocket. It goes without saying that the client's representatives will have access to the corresponding Soviet cosmodrome.

Soviet financial organizations could also provide insurance for the payload. These terms would cater for both the financial interests of the client and the safekeeping of his technological or other secrets. Thus the assertions emanating mainly from the United States concerning the Soviet Union's aspiration to take advantage of the commercial launches of artificial satellites to gain access to Western technology are totally unfounded.

A remarkable example of how international cooperation in the conquest of space should develop was the study of Venus and Halley's Comet conducted in accordance with the Vega Project. Scientists from many countries—Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, France, the FRG and Czechoslovakia—participated in the preparation of the apparatus and realization of the project. Work was coordinated also with scientific programs of the United States, Japan and the European Space Agency (ESA). The interplanetary flight of the Vega 1 and Vega

2 Soviet automatic stations to Venus and toward Halley's Comet was adjusted with the aid of tracking stations located in the most varied parts of the world. And then the Vega stations became a kind of space pilot for the more accurate guidance to the comet of the Giotto craft designed by the ESA. The results of the study, in the scientists' unanimous opinion, exceeded all expectations. Approximately 1,200 images of the comet were obtained and transmitted to the Earth. All this confirms once again the expediency and efficiency of the amalgamation of the scientific and technical potential of different countries in the peaceful conquest of space.

In 1986 Soviet specialists began work in orbit with the new "Mir" space station, which pertains to the third generation of such craft. Compared with its predecessors, the "Mir" has a number of important features. It is fitted with six docking nodes, which makes it possible to link to it up to five specialized modules. Thanks to this, it will be possible to accommodate in orbit dozens of tons of equipment and conduct research in a broad spectrum of directions—from medicine through space metallurgy. The "Mir" station is the nucleus around which a permanent science-production complex will soon be created.

Perhaps the most interesting experiments performed on the basis of the new station were two interorbital flights between the "Mir" and "Salyut 7" stations performed for the first time in the history of space conquest. Such flights make it possible not only to promptly transfer crews and freight from orbit to orbit but, if necessary, to render other spacecraft emergency assistance. The "Mir" will become a venue for work in accordance with programs of international cooperation. Preparations for a whole number of international flights are under way.

A major achievement of Soviet science and technology which afforded broad prospects in the peaceful conquest of space was the successful start of aeronautical and design tests of the "Energia" carrier rocket intended for putting into near-Earth orbit both reusable orbital craft and large-sized scientific and national economic spacecraft.

The need for the creation of a reusable transport space system (RTSS) arises in connection with the fact that the Soviet program of the peaceful conquest of space provides for measures whose implementation demands a considerable increase in freight flows between the Earth and low orbits and also between low and high orbits. Supporting the operation of permanent orbital space stations, the launching of automatic interplanetary stations to distant space and heavy communications satellites and retransmission to geostationary orbit, the placing in orbit of experimental solar power plants and, in the future, the industrialization of outer space—an RTSS is essential for all this. Following final development, it could also be used for the realization of diverse international cooperation projects in the peaceful conquest of space.

Such cooperation would serve as a bridge to confidence building and mutual understanding. The USSR is prepared to develop it with all states both bilaterally and multilaterally. Serious economic considerations support such cooperation also. Scattering and duplicating states' efforts in the conquest of space is imprudent. Their rational use on the basis of coordination and unification would make feasible what is beyond the capabilities of one, even a most developed, country. Even if it is allowed that the "star wars" program will initially prompt scientific development, its result will be the creation of truly suicidal arms. The peaceful conquest of space, on the other hand, will open a fundamentally different—direct and promising—path toward an acceleration of progress in science and production.

It is just such a path which is supported by an absolute majority of states. The appeal addressed by the UN General Assembly 41st Session to all states (particularly those which possess important potential in the space field) for active assistance to the achievement of the goal of the peaceful use of outer space and the adoption of urgent measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interests of the preservation of international peace and security, international cooperation and mutual understanding testifies, *inter alia*, to this. The 41st Session emphasized in other of its resolutions mankind's general interest in promoting the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and mapped out a whole number of specific measures for the development of international cooperation in this sphere.

Such cooperation is opposed by those who see space as a new field for the arms race and a new medium for the achievement of "absolute military superiority."

It is essential to do everything possible to weigh the scale of history in favor of "star peace" and to prevent realization of the plans for "star wars."

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It is not the first time that the question of the creation of an ABM system for the United States has arisen. It was a topic of discussion throughout the 1960's, when the military-industrial complex attempted to advance initially the Sentinel and subsequently the Safeguard systems. As now also, the supporters of the ABM system speculated extensively on the psychological attractiveness of the very idea of defense against nuclear weapons. However, deployment was categorically opposed by R. McNamara, who was at that time (1961-1968) U.S. defense secretary, a number of prominent senators (W. Fulbright, M. Mansfield, F. Church, S. Symington, C. Percy) and also most authoritative strategic arms experts (G. York, [Dzh. Vizner] and G. Ratzhens).

It is significant that the same arguments were put forward against the ABM system as are prominent now also. The destabilizing role of so-called "defensive" arms was emphasized primarily. The huge potential cost of any version was pointed out also. The sum of \$40-50 million was cited at that time as the maximum figure for the most dependable system. In terms of the present day, when the approximate cost of a space-based ABM system has passed the \$1 trillion mark, these amounts appear relatively modest. Finally, its opponents sharply criticized both above-mentioned projects from the viewpoint of their military vulnerability also. In a speech to the editors and proprietors of UPI in San Francisco on 18 September 1967 R. McNamara reached the following conclusion: "It is important to understand that no ABM system which exists at the present time or in the foreseeable future will ensure the creation of an impenetrable shield over the United States."

On 26 May 1972 the United States agreed to the conclusion with the Soviet Union of the Treaty Limiting ABM

Systems and thereby renounced the creation of a broad-based ABM system. The present U.S. leaders prefer not to recall this page of history.

Finally, upon examination of the proposition concerning the "defensive" nature of the SDI the conceptual interconnection between offensive and defensive arms cannot be ignored either. It was recognized both by the United States and the Soviet Union back in 1972. The Soviet-American Treaty Limiting ABM Systems says: "...Effective measures to limit ABM systems would be an essential factor in curbing the strategic offensive arms race and would lead to a lessening of the danger of the outbreak of wars involving the use of nuclear weapons." And the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the United States on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms emphasizes plainly that the parties take into consideration "the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive arms." And the very fact of the simultaneous conclusion of the two agreements is sufficiently eloquent testimony to such an interconnection.

Currently the American "star wars" supporters are trying to portray matters such that the situation changes fundamentally in connection with the appearance of new technical possibilities. In actual fact the interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive systems exists objectively and is for this reason of a permanent nature. Nor does it disappear, of course, with the appearance of the possibility of the creation of technically more accomplished and efficient ABM systems. The 1972 Soviet-American treaty was concluded on precisely this basis. It banned not some specific systems developed in the 1960's but the creation of ABM systems in principle. It was for this reason that the treaty included the provision concerning its permanency (article XV).

The point being that the general correlation of forces between the sides is determined with regard for both offensive and defensive types of arms. If, given military-strategic parity, one side should acquire a defensive system capable of neutralizing, say, 50 percent of the strategic weapons of the other side, parity would clearly be disturbed. The side which had created such a defensive system would acquire twofold superiority in strategic weapons.

To restore the disturbed parity the other side would be forced to increase its strategic power either by way of a direct buildup of its offensive forces or by supplementing them with defensive weapons. In any event, all this would lead to a further arms race, raising it to an increasingly high qualitative and quantitative level.

II

The "Strategic Defense Initiative" is being heralded as a resource which will make nuclear weapons "obsolete and unnecessary." The SDI is thereby being ascribed the role virtually of the savior of mankind from the nuclear

threat. However, while declaring that the creation of ABM defenses will lead to the "withering away" of nuclear weapons the U.S. Administration is continuing to implement at an accelerated pace programs of an increase in all components of its strategic triad, ballistic missiles primarily. New types of strategic offensive arms are being developed simultaneously.

Their creation is based over many years ahead—at least through the end of the millennium. What is the point of spending billion-dollar sums on arms, which, as the authors of the SDI maintain, will become "obsolete and unnecessary"? It would be far more intelligent to negotiate right now a reduction in nuclear arms. The nuclear threat would then be reduced, and huge material resources could be used for creative purposes.

At one time nuclear weapons were also presented as an alternative to conventional arms. However, the creation of tremendous nuclear arsenals has by no means reduced the role of conventional arms. On the contrary, these arms continue to be increased and upgraded, to which, for example, the "Rogers Plan" testifies. Finally, if there is the possibility of if only some nuclear missiles breaching ABM defenses, this will only spur the nuclear arms race.

The destabilizing role of ABM defenses would show up in all instances. Of course, a situation wherein one side, having created ABM defenses, disrupted the strategic parity would be the most dangerous. Such an argument is, incidentally, purely speculative. In practice the other side would, of course, adopt retaliatory measures either by way of an increase in offensive weapons or the creation of defensive ones. Parity would be maintained. But it would be even more fragile, and computation of the correlation of military potentials would be more complicated. There would be increased uncertainty in the evaluation of the forces of the opposite side and an increased likelihood of miscalculations, each of which could be fatal.

As far as the role of "deterrence" is concerned, the assertion concerning the need therefor in respect of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries is contrived since the unleashing of war is contrary to the fundamental principles of their foreign policy. Further, in the arguments of the defenders of the "strategic initiative" concerning the "deterrent" role of the SDI the ends do not meet: on the one hand it is seemingly intended that the two opposite sides—both the United States and the USSR—should possess all-embracing ABM systems for the promised "stabilizing effect" to be obtained (President R. Reagan even mentioned somehow the possibility of the Soviet Union being granted the necessary technical information concerning a space-based ABM defense).

At the same time, however, U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger believes that the situation would be "stable" if just the United States possesses such a system. Finally,

neither the bilateral nor unilateral creation of ABM defenses would in any way be reflected in the correlation of forces in the sphere of conventional arms and, consequently, would not lead to a change in the position of Washington, which justifies the permissibility of delivering a nuclear first strike by the fact that the USSR allegedly has superiority in conventional arms.

The U.S. Administration maintains that the work on realization of the SDI is of a "research" nature and is not for this reason contrary to the 1972 treaty.

Yet the mere formulation of the question of the deployment of a space-based ABM system manifestly testifies to an intention to violate the 1972 treaty. Washington has advanced as cover the so-called "broad interpretation" of the treaty, according to which it is maintained that it permits the creation and testing of ABM systems or components thereof of any type of basing, space included, if they are based on "different physical principles" to those which existed in 1972.

The administration's attempts to put into circulation and legalize the "broad interpretation" of the treaty has given rise to sharp criticism in Congress and the public and political circles of the country. In March 1987 S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, presented the report "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty" analyzing the general meaning and individual provisions of the document. The report's main conclusion was that the new, "broad" meaning completely contradicts the understanding of the treaty by Congress and the Executive at the time of its ratification. The report emphasizes that if a practice whereby this president or the other may interpret agreements signed by his predecessors as he sees fit is accepted, it would be altogether impossible for the United States to subscribe to any international treaties.

In Reykjavik the Soviet Union proposed that both sides undertake for a period of 10 years not to avail themselves of their right to withdraw from the treaty. The testing of ABM components in space would throughout this period remain prohibited, as the treaty requires. Such a prohibition would not extend, however, to research and tests conducted within a laboratory framework, that is, scientific research on the ground—in institutes and at test ranges and plants. In addition, for the purpose of removing disagreements concerning the boundary which cannot be crossed in the research, engineering and testing of facilities of an ABM defense the Soviet Union proposed to the United States the coordination of the list of the devices which would not be put into space in the course of the research.

The main purpose of the SDI, however it is camouflaged, is with its help to achieve military superiority to the Soviet Union. The "star wars" program—despite all its seeming novelty—essentially amounts to a routine attempt by U.S. ruling circles to achieve "absolute security" for themselves while having put all others in a

position of "absolute danger." What it has not for decades been possible to achieve with the aid of increasingly new twists of the nuclear arms race spiral on Earth it is now intended obtaining by way of the use of the latest space technology.

III

The Soviet Union consistently advocates outer space serving the progress of mankind and being excluded for all time from the sphere of military activity. Following the launch of the first artificial Earth satellite the USSR proposed in a memorandum on disarmament issues of 15 March 1958 a specific program for prevention of the militarization of space providing for a ban on all types of military use thereof without exception, including the use of ICBM's.

The Treaty on the Principles of States' Activity Pertaining to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, was concluded in 1967 to a considerable extent as a result of the Soviet Union's efforts. More than 80 states subscribe to it currently. The treaty contains together with a broad range of principles of a general nature regulating states' activity pertaining to the exploration and use of space provisions pertaining to a partial ban on an arms race in space and also to the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies solely for peaceful purposes. Most material are states' undertakings not to put into circumterrestrial orbit any facilities containing nuclear or other types of weapon of mass extermination, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to deploy them in outer space in any other manner and also the ban on the creation on celestial bodies of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any types of weapons and military maneuvers.

In 1981 the Soviet Union presented the initiative pertaining to the conclusion of a treaty banning in outer space weapons of any kind. In 1983 it proposed further progress and the negotiation of a ban on the use of force both in outer space and from space in relation to the Earth. The USSR believes possible agreement also on partial measures aimed at preventing the deployment of weapons in space. For example, the elaboration of an international agreement on the assured immunity of artificial Earth satellites could be embarked upon. A search for an opportunity to ban the creation of new and to eliminate existing ASAT systems would be important also.

The conclusion of a multilateral agreement containing assurances in international law of the inviolability of space objects would contribute to the development of trust between states and a strengthening of security and strategic stability. The withdrawal from states' arsenals of the ASAT weapons which already exist and also the renunciation of the testing and creation of new systems

of such weapons would be a practicable disarmament measure maintaining the existing military balance and corresponding to the demands of the principle of equality and equal security.

In 1986 the Geneva Conference on Disarmament actively discussed the question of definition of space-based assault arms. The Soviet delegation proposed the incorporation here of space-based ABM facilities of any operational principle; space-based weapons of any operational principle designed for the destruction from space of targets in the terrestrial atmosphere or on the Earth's surface; weapons of all types of basing of any operational principle intended for destroying space facilities.

In order to shift discussion of the question of preventing an arms race in space from a position of standstill right now the USSR is proposing examination of the possibility of the creation of a system of international supervision of the prevention of the deployment there of weapons of any kind, which envisages the establishment of an international inspectorate. The latter would be accorded right of access—for the purpose of on-site inspection—to all facilities intended for guidance into and deployment in outer space and to the corresponding guidance systems. All space object launches could be carried out under the observation of the inspectors. This proposal confirms the fact that, for the Soviet Union the problem of verification would not be an obstacle were it a question of the real prevention of the arms race moving into space.

At the Conference on Disarmament in February 1987 the Soviet delegation put forward the proposal concerning the adoption of measures to prohibit "space to space," "space to earth" and "earth to space" weapons class systems. A special letter from N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the UN secretary general in June 1986 developed a program of practical action pertaining to the organization of international cooperation in the conquest of outer space. It is of a comprehensive nature and constructed such as to take into consideration the interests of all states—from the leading space states to those for whom possibilities connected with the conquest of space are only just opening up. Of course, the organization of multilateral international cooperation in space is a highly complex process, and it should be realized in well conceived and gradual manner.

At the first stage of a duration of approximately 5 years it would be expedient to study peoples' requirements concerning the use of space equipment, taking into consideration both the current state thereof and development prospects. The logical culmination of this stage could be the convening of an international conference or a special UN General Assembly session on space issues or some other suitable forum, which could approve an action program for the 1990's with a view to the subsequent 10-15 years and examine the question of the

establishment of a world space organization—an all-purpose interstate organization with its own charter in the form of an international treaty.

The main tasks which it would tackle would be the coordination of cooperation programs and projects in various spheres of cosmonautics; the most rational expenditure of the resources allocated for space conquest purposes; actual assistance to states when necessary. The range of possible actions is extraordinarily wide: from space communications, navigation and long-distance exploration of the Earth through the creation of new energy sources, the development of new materials and technology and the organization of production in space. Finally, the organization could as agreements on prevention of the spread of the arms race to space are concluded monitor compliance therewith also.

It would be fair for the main resources for international projects under the aegis of a world space organization to be allocated primarily by the space powers and other economically developed countries. The developing states could participate in the projects on preferential terms, and the least developed countries, obtain the scientific and technical results of the efforts by way of assistance for development purposes.

The development and creation of space equipment for realization of the above-mentioned international projects could be embarked upon at the second stage of the program proposed by the USSR. Of course, it would be advisable initially to concentrate forces in the priority spheres like, for example, global study of the Earth's biosphere for the elaboration and implementation of measures to preserve it. The world space organization would begin its activity with the coordination of national plans for space conquest, the organization of a broad exchange of the results of space activity and assistance to countries taking the first steps in the use of space.

The third stage, geared to the final 5-year period of the 20th century, proposes realization of the projects which have been started, practical returns therefrom and the laying of the material basis for the further development of international cooperation. It would then be possible to embark on the accomplishment of more large-scale tasks such as the creation of space equipment for transition in the first decades of the 21st century even to the planned conquest and use of the Moon, specifically as a base for flights to other planets.

The Soviet program is a call for cooperation addressed to all states without exception. The basis thereof is the profound belief that the development of wide-ranging international cooperation in the peaceful conquest of space is a constructive alternative to the plans to extend the arms race to near-Earth space.

It was this approach which permeated the proposal made by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to India concerning the creation with the assistance of the leading space

powers of an international center for joint R&D pertaining to orders of the developing countries for models of space equipment. A school for training specialists from these countries, including cosmonauts, and also a range for the launching of space objects would function under the auspices of the center.

The USSR has declared its readiness to exchange achievements in the conquest of space with all states and to launch peaceful spacecraft of other countries and international organizations with their carrier rockets on mutually acceptable terms. The USSR is prepared to make considerable benefits available when putting spacecraft into orbit for the developing countries.

The Soviet Union has several types of carriers and, consequently, could put into orbit the most diverse spacecraft. Specialists believe that the "Proton" rocket is the most promising. There are other types of rockets also, specifically the three-stage "Soyuz" and small single-stage "Vertikal" fitted with a reusable equipment container. These carriers also have given a good account of themselves in the practice of space activity.

In replies to questions from TASS correspondents in January 1987 N.I. Ryzhkov declared that Soviet state authorities would grant clients the necessary assurances of the safekeeping of their spacecraft while on the territory of the USSR—from the moment it crossed the border right up until launch. The Soviet Union is prepared to exempt apparatus intended for launch from customs inspection and authorize its transportation over USSR territory and delivery to the cosmodrome in a sealed container if such is convenient for the client. Foreign specialists will be able accompany their spacecraft and be present during its transportation and installation on the carrier rocket. It goes without saying that the client's representatives will have access to the corresponding Soviet cosmodrome.

Soviet financial organizations could also provide insurance for the payload. These terms would cater for both the financial interests of the client and the safekeeping of his technological or other secrets. Thus the assertions emanating mainly from the United States concerning the Soviet Union's aspiration to take advantage of the commercial launches of artificial satellites to gain access to Western technology are totally unfounded.

A remarkable example of how international cooperation in the conquest of space should develop was the study of Venus and Halley's Comet conducted in accordance with the Vega Project. Scientists from many countries—Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, France, the FRG and Czechoslovakia—participated in the preparation of the apparatus and realization of the project. Work was coordinated also with scientific programs of the United States, Japan and the European Space Agency (ESA). The interplanetary flight of the Vega 1 and Vega

2 Soviet automatic stations to Venus and toward Halley's Comet was adjusted with the aid of tracking stations located in the most varied parts of the world. And then the Vega stations became a kind of space pilot for the more accurate guidance to the comet of the Giotto craft designed by the ESA. The results of the study, in the scientists' unanimous opinion, exceeded all expectations. Approximately 1,200 images of the comet were obtained and transmitted to the Earth. All this confirms once again the expediency and efficiency of the amalgamation of the scientific and technical potential of different countries in the peaceful conquest of space.

In 1986 Soviet specialists began work in orbit with the new "Mir" space station, which pertains to the third generation of such craft. Compared with its predecessors, the "Mir" has a number of important features. It is fitted with six docking nodes, which makes it possible to link to it up to five specialized modules. Thanks to this, it will be possible to accommodate in orbit dozens of tons of equipment and conduct research in a broad spectrum of directions—from medicine through space metallurgy. The "Mir" station is the nucleus around which a permanent science-production complex will soon be created.

Perhaps the most interesting experiments performed on the basis of the new station were two interorbital flights between the "Mir" and "Salyut 7" stations performed for the first time in the history of space conquest. Such flights make it possible not only to promptly transfer crews and freight from orbit to orbit but, if necessary, to render other spacecraft emergency assistance. The "Mir" will become a venue for work in accordance with programs of international cooperation. Preparations for a whole number of international flights are under way.

A major achievement of Soviet science and technology which afforded broad prospects in the peaceful conquest of space was the successful start of aeronautical and design tests of the "Energiya" carrier rocket intended for putting into near-Earth orbit both reusable orbital craft and large-sized scientific and national economic spacecraft.

The need for the creation of a reusable transport space system (RTSS) arises in connection with the fact that the Soviet program of the peaceful conquest of space provides for measures whose implementation demands a considerable increase in freight flows between the Earth and low orbits and also between low and high orbits. Supporting the operation of permanent orbital space stations, the launching of automatic interplanetary stations to distant space and heavy communications satellites and retransmission to geostationary orbit, the placing in orbit of experimental solar power plants and, in the future, the industrialization of outer space—an RTSS is essential for all this. Following final development, it could also be used for the realization of diverse international cooperation projects in the peaceful conquest of space.

Such cooperation would serve as a bridge to confidence building and mutual understanding. The USSR is prepared to develop it with all states both bilaterally and multilaterally. Serious economic considerations support such cooperation also. Scattering and duplicating states' efforts in the conquest of space is imprudent. Their rational use on the basis of coordination and unification would make feasible what is beyond the capabilities of one, even a most developed, country. Even if it is allowed that the "star wars" program will initially prompt scientific development, its result will be the creation of truly suicidal arms. The peaceful conquest of space, on the other hand, will open a fundamentally different—direct and promising—path toward an acceleration of progress in science and production.

It is just such a path which is supported by an absolute majority of states. The appeal addressed by the UN General Assembly 41st Session to all states (particularly those which possess important potential in the space field) for active assistance to the achievement of the goal of the peaceful use of outer space and the adoption of urgent measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interests of the preservation of international peace and security, international cooperation and mutual understanding testifies, *inter alia*, to this. The 41st Session emphasized in other of its resolutions mankind's general interest in promoting the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes and mapped out a whole number of specific measures for the development of international cooperation in this sphere.

Such cooperation is opposed by those who see space as a new field for the arms race and a new medium for the achievement of "absolute military superiority."

It is essential to do everything possible to weigh the scale of history in favor of "star peace" and to prevent realization of the plans for "star wars."

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Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability Linked
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[Article by G. Kochetkov and V. Sergeyev: "Artificial Intelligence and Problems of Strategic Stability"]

[Text] The arms computerization process is attracting specialists' attention, particularly in connection with the start of realization of a whole number of major national and international programs such as the "Fifth-Generation Computer" (Japan), ESPRIT (the Common Market countries) and the "Strategic Computer Initiative" (United States). However, it is mainly tactical-technical

parameters of the possible systems and their economic specifications which are the subject of analysis, in the main. The question of the qualitative changes which will be made to warfare by contemporary information technology, which is increasingly acquiring the features of "intelligence booster," remains on the sidelines here, as a rule.

This bias may be explained partially by the fact that a sharp polarization of the perception of the world by the supporters of different traditions in military affairs is taking place in the period of technological breakthroughs. Concentrated at one pole are the representatives of engineering culture interested mainly in ascertainment of the possibilities of the new types and systems of military equipment, at the other, specialists attempting to understand how the new technical possibilities will influence the accomplishment of set military-political tasks.

Yet the new equipment and technology are not simply additional material means of the achievement of known goals. They are a new world arranged in accordance with hitherto unknown principles. The genesis of strategic and political goals therein will proceed differently.

Particular attention has been attracted to military-strategic aspects of the active introduction of information technology to arms systems in connection with the plans for realization of the "strategic defense initiative." But in this case also discussion concerns mainly problems of technical-economic feasibility, reliability and so forth. The influence of artificial intelligence systems (AIS) on the stability of military-strategic interaction remains practically unstudied. Recognition of the nature of the "new world" and the new military-strategic situation is, as practice shows, proceeding extremely slowly. But it is these problems, it would seem, which need to be studied primarily. For this it is necessary to examine the particular features of the situation which has arisen in connection with the general introduction of information technology to the armed forces in the light of the general trends of S&T progress and its influence on the military-political balance. We shall attempt to summarize the first results of the discussion of these questions by leading foreign specialists.

S&T Progress and the Military-Political Balance

It is necessary first of all to analyze the possible influence of the extensive use of the latest information technology on the structure of the military-political balance. Troop strength, firepower, mobilization potential, state of development of communications and transport, state of the economy and military industry and a number of others are usually attributed currently to the constituents of military strength. This multidimensionality was for a long time a principal reason for difficulties in making a quantitative assessment and comparison of armed forces

with different structures. Finding a balance pertained to the sphere of the high art of military men and politicians and not rational calculation.

The idea of a balance of forces took shape as a result of a lengthy historical process and under the appreciable influence of technical progress. In the period which followed the Napoleonic wars, which to a large extent overturned the ideas concerning the essence and methods of the use of military power, a period marked by a radical change in views on the organization of armed forces (transition from a limited professional army to an "armed people" army), tremendous significance was attached to mobilization measures. With the establishment of new principles of army formation an intensive search for increasingly refined technical means of annihilation began and the arms race arose.

The development of military industry was based to a large extent on the latest scientific achievements of its time. Thus invention of the steam turbine permitted the creation of heavy swift armored personnel carriers, and the appearance of the internal combustion engine, tanks, which led to a weakening of the role of cavalry and, subsequently, is virtual liquidation. Each new such achievement radically altered the basic parameters of the balance of forces which had taken shape between the world powers and led to a new round of the arms race, now being realized within the framework of a different concept of balance.

A revolution in the concept of military power occurred in connection with the appearance of nuclear weapons, more precisely, the formation of the "strategic triad" (ICBM's, missile-firing submarines and strategic bombers). As a result of the intersecting of two lines of the development of technology, namely, the increase in the yield of nuclear weapons and the creation of delivery systems, a weapons system with fundamentally new properties emerged. Nuclear weapons combine tremendous power of destruction with broad strategic potential. In the first and second world wars the main target for military operations were groupings of the enemy's ground troops, aviation and navy positioned in direct proximity to the front. Depth of impact at that time was determined by the operational possibilities of aviation, and overall strategic success was composed, as a rule, of individual successes achieved in battles, engagements and operations.

Strategic nuclear forces have become capable of tackling the basic assignments of armed struggle, and in a short time, moreover, and on the entire territory of the main enemy and his allies. In the prenuclear period strategic goals were achieved primarily by means of mobilization, deployment of military potential and the operational-tactical use of battlefield weapons. The nuclear "triad" has made real the possibility of direct mass destruction throughout the depth of enemy territory and has erased

the boundary between front and rear. And the practical absence of effective means of defense has imparted to nuclear weapons an absolute nature.

All this has led to a total rebuilding of ideas concerning the structure of military power. The sharp reduction in the time of deployment of military operations has reduced practically to nothing the significance of mobilization capabilities and the transfer of the economy to a war footing following the start of an armed conflict. States' military potential has come to be determined primarily by the presence of nuclear weapons and their quantity and the technical sophistication of delivery systems.

This new structure has entailed profound changes in the military-political sphere, primarily a significant increase in the political factor. The absolute nature of nuclear weapons has reduced the nuclear balance equation basically to quantitative and qualitative parameters of the "strategic triad." Doctrines of its use coming to replace one another are based on the idea of the "balance of terror" and represent an attempt to inscribe a qualitatively new military-political situation within the framework of the ideas concerning international political structures inherited from the past. The ideas of the establishment of control over the arms race are aimed at limiting the quantity and halting the qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons and creating procedures reducing the likelihood of mistaken decisions owing to the incorrect interpretation of the actions of the opposite side.

However, the entire course of events of the past decade has shown that the rate of sophistication of weapons systems threatens to explode the structure of political control constructed per the "deterrence" principle. Nuclear weapons are not only being upgraded themselves but are imparting powerful impetus to the development of all other weapons systems, including control, communications and reconnaissance systems, increasing sharply the demands on the qualitative specifications of conventional weapons—reliability, maneuverability, degree of protection, capacity for accomplishing assignments given a large percentage of losses and degree of coordination of the use of different weapons systems in space and time.

Exceptional significance is attached to the fact that the decision-making timeframe is determined today by a missile's flight time. The discrepancy between strictly political and military decisions is virtually reduced to nothing. The role of the initial period, which could largely predetermine the outcome of the whole war, increases even more. As a result a powerful incentive to the development of control, communications and reconnaissance systems which ensure the most reliable substantiation possible for military-political decisions, given the reduction in the time for their adoption, is created.

Thus S&T progress in the mid-20th century had actually led to a complete change in the possibilities of the parties to a conflict and the transformation of the picture of the world within whose framework military-political decisions are adopted and implemented. Simultaneously the intrinsic logic of development of weapons systems led to the enlistment in this process of the latest spheres of information technology and the emergence of "crossings" of lines of technical development whose consequences are difficult to predict.

New Information Technology and the Control Factor

Let us now examine certain basic, in the opinion of foreign specialists, directions of the application of AIS in the military sphere; if it comes to the point of military operations at the nonnuclear level, under current conditions they will be characterized by increased scale, the participation of various types of armed forces equipped with diverse intricate combat equipment, the high dynamism and maneuverability of the combat operations, their performance under the conditions of the absence of a continuous front, abrupt and rapid changes in the situation and a bitter struggle to seize and hold on to territory. The army thus becomes a complex socio-technical system, that is, one in which integral functions may be performed only by the joint operations of large aggregates of interacting people and machinery. The control of combat operations under these conditions will be immeasurably more complicated.

The possibility of automated control has been revealed in connection with the rapid development of information science and computer technology. The creation on a new basis of comprehensive automated systems has made it possible to ensure the promptitude, stability, concealment and continuousness of the control of troops and weapons. This is leading to a sharp reduction in the time and forces necessary for the organization of battle and permitting an improvement in the interaction and coordination of operations and, as a whole, the enhanced stability of control of the forces and resources of armed struggle. As a result the "control factor" is beginning to play a more pronounced part in the balance of forces equation. It can no longer be considered contemptibly small compared with the nuclear and other purely power factors. A methodology of its consideration upon an analysis of the actual distribution of forces in the world and in individual regions is necessary.

The creation of such a methodology is complicated by the fact that the introduction of "intelligent technology" constituting the basis of the "control factor" under the conditions of the S&T revolution has at different levels of military and political activity clearly expressed specific features. At the highest level it is revolutionizing primarily the gathering and processing of information, affording persons making the decisions an opportunity to compose in an extraordinarily short time a general idea of the global military-political situation. A most

important consequence of the use of AIS in this sphere is the enhanced promptitude of the detection of changes in the military-political situation in the world and, consequently, a reduction in time needed by the political leadership to react to such changes.

In troop control the introduction of AIS is influencing the methods and nature of activity at all three levels: strategic, operational and tactical.

A most important change arising at the first of these levels is the enhancement of the qualitative specifications of strategic weapons, for example, the accuracy of all types of missiles, ballistic primarily. Arms developed along the path of an increase in weapons' maximum range and their power of destruction. However, possibilities of controlling the fired projectile were lost here.

To solve this problem—inasmuch as until recently the intelligence vector was man alone—two technical possibilities existed:

making man part of the weapon's delivery system (aviation). In extreme forms this developed into the creation of aircraft-projectiles and torpedoes guided by suicide pilots; developing projective remote-control systems (radio controlled aircraft-projectiles and torpedoes, anti-tank guided missiles and such).

With the appearance of AIS a third possibility emerged—intellectualizing weapons, that is, endowing operational systems with the capacity of independent selection of targets (in accordance with a certain description thereof) and self-guidance to the targets. The efficiency of the new arms systems has thus been enhanced considerably. The possibility of the incorporation in NATO countries' current military doctrines of conclusions concerning the capacity of arms fitted with artificial intelligence components to ensure the effective destruction of strategic nuclear forces should be emphasized particularly.

Let us clarify this point. The appearance of nuclear weapons in the 1940's made it possible to switch to the destruction of targets over vast areas (the casualty range is proportional to the cube root of the yield of the weapon. With an increase in the yield of the weapon by a factor of 10 to the power 6 to 10 to the power 7 and considering, furthermore, the secondary consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, it proved possible to provide for the destruction of targets on areas of hundreds of square kilometers).

In the WWII period target identification on the ground and firing were extremely inaccurate. Under the conditions of the use of conventional weapons the average all-around deviation was appreciably greater than the casualty range, which made fire inefficient. For this reason extensive use was made of concentrated artillery and aviation fire.

Considering that the probability of destruction of the target depends on the ratio of the yield of the weapon to the cube of the mean all-around deviation, we see that in addition to an increase in the yield of the weapon there is also another method of appreciably increasing the efficiency of fire—reducing the radius of the mean all-around deviation. And the said deviation, furthermore, exerts a far greater influence than the change in yield. This, of course, requires an entirely different level of knowledgeability about targets' whereabouts and a new quality of guidance-to-target systems.

It is in this direction that a type of AIS of military use is developing. At the present time even cruise missiles fitted with the corresponding guidance systems reliably hit small targets at a distance of thousands of kilometers. A situation is being created wherein an increase in accuracy is becoming the equivalent of an increase in the yield of a conventional warhead to the level of a nuclear weapon. This trend is intensifying in line with the introduction of systems for controlling and tracking combat operations with the use of AIS. Currently this approach is becoming an essential part of the doctrine of use of the U.S. armed forces. AIS are thereby becoming a decisive factor determining the correlation of forces. Specialists allow that a world war could begin with the use of conventional weapons alone and then grow into a

nuclear conflict. The saturation of modern weapons systems with electronics could lead to increased instability and a temptation to start operations with "smart weapons" in the hope of putting an enemy's nuclear potential out of action with a preemptive strike by conventional forces.

Another most important aspect of the use of AIS is connected with the control of strategic forces, including space-based ABM systems. Given the current level of development of strategic arms, the time from the detection of an enemy attack to the start of retaliatory defensive measures has been reduced to a matter of minutes, in which it is necessary to analyze a tremendous amount of information. Man is incapable of this. With the help of "intelligent technology" the time could be extended, as it were; thanks to: a) earlier detection by electronic reconnaissance systems using image recognition systems, data base and knowledge base control intelligence systems and so forth; b) the increased speed and reliability of communications, a change in the number of message transformations and so forth; c) the extensive use of expert systems for analyzing the data obtained and formulating decisions and so forth.

The cycle of control of combat operations might be presented in the following form:

1. Data-gathering	equating to	Reconnaissance and early warning systems
2. Data recognition	"	"
3. Interpretation of facts	equating to	Expert system of control of combat operations
4. Comparison and integration of data	"	"
5. Forecast of situation	equating to	Man
6. Conclusions and assessments	equating to	Expert systems of control of combat operations
7. Formulation of recommendations for action	"	"
8. Decision-making	equating to	Man
9. Control of operations	equating to	Guidance system
10. Control of execution of operations	"	"

In this cycle the controlling subject interacts with the environment, and, furthermore, AIS functions were even recently confined to supporting reconnaissance and early warning systems and guidance-to-target systems. With the development of expert systems there has been an increase in the role of AIS in the control of combat operations. Left to man is mainly the function, which is very hard to automate, of forecasting the situation and ultimate decision-making, while the extraordinarily important functions of interpreting and comparing facts and formulating and evaluating alternatives are left to an increasingly large extent to computers. This use of AIS in the military sphere will lead in the very near future to the development of a number of dangerous new trends which are hard to predict. Politicians of Western countries often rely in their plans not so much on the realities of "intelligent technology" as on its possibilities. As a result an extraordinarily risky situation is being created: circles connected with the military-industrial complex

are conducting an active propaganda campaign in support of new weapons systems, and the illusion that technical questions have already been solved and that it is necessary merely to support a political decision on the deployment of the systems is being created in the public deliberately.

But in reality the fundamental study of the use of AIS in armaments has far from been brought to a conclusion, particularly as regards the role of the human factor and political control of the use of the new weapons systems.

Even if the question of technical reliability and feasibility is left to one side for the moment, no less complex and serious problems remain. For example, one such is connected with the fact that the present-day expert systems represent the "skimmed" experience of specialists who actually exist which has been verified in practice and which has proven its viability. In the sphere of

military use there is a fundamental difference between expert systems of the lower (for the control of military equipment and weapons systems), middle and upper levels. In the latter case the experience of specialists who actually exist is highly limited or missing altogether. Experience acquired in tests and also with the aid of modeling and games is not adequate to the realities of a hypothetical war. For this reason the value of expert systems of the highest level is relative. The use of expert systems in such complex socio-technical systems as the planned SDI entails a serious danger. It is connected primarily with two types of inadequacies:

- the possibilities of the parameters of the situation going beyond the limits envisaged in the control system (the increased velocity of the missiles in the boost phase, unduly low launch trajectories and so forth);
- the emergence of scenarios of the development of events not envisaged in the expert system.

An indisputable advantage of the human factor in the decision-making systems remains at the present time man's capacity for distinguishing and evaluating new surprise aspects in complex situations. In the event of the transition of the combat control system to an automated posture, these advantages would be lost, and in some situations the AIS would be operating in conflict with purely human standards of behavior.

It is clear in practice today even that whatever level of automation is achieved, in the actual systems of the control of combat operations the AIS will, as before, operate in close working contact with people. This raises the most complex question of the interaction of AIS and man—the aggregate intelligence of a group of operators. Its study has been extraordinarily insufficient. But it is clear even today that all probable situations cannot be determined in advance in such systems endowed with "hybrid intelligence," if only owing to the impossibility of determining man's behavior.

Man's behavior in any unforeseen situation is conditioned not only by his knowledgeability but mainly by the system of values and moral and ethical standards operating in society. Ultimately, however odd this may appear, it will be essential to develop a system of machine behavioral standards like Isaac Asimov's universally known laws of robotics. But inasmuch as it is a question of "hybrid" systems, an inalienable part of which is man, it is standards and rules of behavior common to all mankind which must condition the behavior of such systems in unforeseen situations. And this confronts experts in the artificial intelligence field also with entirely new scientific problems, which at the present time are very far from solution.

Today, with the appearance of progressive information technology, a new channel of the functioning of social standards in the form of a programmed product has been created, and the possibility exists, furthermore, of their

alienation in machine's memory and knowledge bases. And which system of standards is embedded in the intelligence systems of the control of complex arms systems is not simply a technical task, as attempts are frequently made to portray it, but a political and ethical task of tremendous importance.

It should be added that even given the removal of all possible technical defects in complex AIS, there is one procedural problem whose importance is being underestimated. It is common knowledge that a central problem in the creation of AIS is that of "comprehension" of the images of the real world and their recognition and the extraction and representation of the meaning of the information received. The majority of models of such comprehension operates with big defects. Given the creation of specific narrowly specialized AIS, these flaws may not exceed the permissible limits and not prevent the satisfactory accomplishment of the set assignments. But the question of how a complex system consisting of a multitude of "nonideal" expert systems would behave remains unresearched as yet. We are far from resurrecting a fear of machines which might rebel against their creators, although this theme has been very popular in the classics of cybernetics. But in connection with the plans for the creation of space-based weapons, control of which is to be exercised with the participation of a multitude of expert systems, the question would seem highly serious.

Thus the use of AIS in the military sphere is at the present time encountering two types of limitations. One of them, connected with the technical imperfection of the existing AIS, may evidently be removed in the foreseeable future with the development of theoretical research in the sphere of cognitive modeling. The other type of limitation, connected with the socio-technical nature of systems of control of combat operations, is unremovable in principle and requires the creation of a system of measures of political control, whose development at the present time is encountering difficulties primarily owing to the position of the United States.

Under the conditions of the incorporation of AIS in arms and troop control systems which has begun preservation of the stability, certainty and firmness of the military-political situation becomes vitally important. The level of military confrontation in the world has become inordinately high. The control of tremendous military machines has grown in complexity. Adequately evaluating the dynamically changing situation, particularly given the emergence of critical situations, has become difficult.

The process of the introduction of computer technology in all spheres of social life is irreversible. However, it can be controlled. At this stage the formulation of the question of banning the use of AIS in arms systems is encountering considerable obstacles. It would seem, however, that it should more than ever today be a question of curbing a further arms race based on the

development of confidence-building measures in all directions. The scientific community's responsibility in elucidating questions connected with the use of the achievements of artificial intelligence and its possible military-political and socioeconomic consequences is extraordinarily great. An objective evaluation of the impact of these resources on the level of international security is essential.

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8850

Poll Shows Most Americans Favor INF Treaty
08151011 Moscow TASS in English
0904 GMT 15 Dec 87

[Text] Washington December 15 TASS—Most Americans welcome the signing of the Soviet-American INF Treaty and come out for the reduction of Soviet and American strategic nuclear arsenals. This follows from the returns of a public opinion poll taken jointly by

WASHINGTON POST and the ABC television company immediately after the end of the meeting in Washington of the Soviet and American leaders. They showed as well that support for the disarmament process taking shape today had been perceptibly increased after the summit.

Thus, 62 percent of the polled said that they supported the signing of the treaty. Before the summit the figure was 52 percent said that they favoured the signing by the U.S. and the USSR of another agreement on the reduction of strategic armaments by 50 percent. 68 percent of the polled said that they favoured a Soviet-American agreement on complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It is noteworthy that the attitude of Americans to President Reagan's foreign policy changed perceptibly after the summit. Thus, before the summit it was supported by 64 percent of the polled, while after the summit the figure was 57 percent.

Answering the question about their attitude to both leaders, 65 percent of the polled said that Mikhail Gorbachev had produced a favourable impression on them. 61 percent of the polled expressed the same attitude to Ronald Reagan.

7946

CYPRUS

Kiprianou Hails U.S.-Soviet INF Agreement

10091853 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek
1756 GMT 9 Dec 87

[Text] President Kiprianou has hailed the agreement for the abolition of medium-range missiles, describing it as a first substantive step toward eliminating the dangers which threaten humanity and a clear indication of the two superpowers' political will to proceed in the correct direction.

In a statement, President Kiprianou adds that progress in the field of disarmament, especially of nuclear disarmament, constitutes a fact of supreme importance for the survival and future of humanity while simultaneously substantively contributing to the steadfast improvement of relations between the two superpowers and to establishing a better atmosphere for cooperation between them for the solution of other serious international problems. There is no doubt, President Kiprianou adds in his statement, that the two superpowers are in a position to cooperate constructively in dealing with and solving these problems, among which the Cyprus problem is certainly included.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Genscher on East-West Relations, Disarmament

17231414 Frankfurt Hessischer Rundfunk Network in German 1030 GMT 22 Nov 87

["Excerpt" of statement by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher from an interview with correspondents Bergdoll and Middeldorf on the "Frankfurter Esprach" program; date and place not given — recorded]

[Excerpt] The new East-West dialogue is already under way. Europe must ensure that it does not remain a U.S.-Soviet dialogue, but that Europe will also lead the new dialogue.

The meeting of the two foreign ministers in Geneva underscores the orientation of the two superpowers toward success, showing that both of them are seriously interested in making the Washington summit a success.

I believe that the way in which the Iran-Iraq war was treated by the UN Security Council demonstrates an attitude of new responsibility—a new way of thinking. If that were followed in other hotbeds of crises, it would be a great success. If the new way of thinking is to be successful, it must not be reduced to disarmament negotiations. It must be extended to cover all aspects of East-West relations.

I think it is wrong of the Europeans to complain that the dialogue is taking place over their heads. It should not be so much criticism of the United States and the Soviet

Union as self-criticism. If you pull your head down between your shoulders, do not be surprised if others speak over your head. It would be in Europe's greatest interest if we achieved progress in disarmament as well as in the qualitative improvement of East-West relations. If you think about how some Europeans have hesitated over the double-zero solution, although it particularly serves European interests, it becomes clear that active European policy is necessary in East-West relations.

The FRG faces that necessity. We pointed out very early that the policy of opening, as pursued by General Secretary Gorbachev, must be seen as a historical opportunity to improve East-West relations, and basically to change the situation in Europe. It should serve the great goal of Western policy: to create a European peace order (friedensordnung) from the Atlantic to the Urals.

I see two important steps to be taken during Reagan's remaining term in office: There is a chance of achieving agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic potentials. Second, the successful conclusion of the Geneva negotiations on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, which would help eliminate a terrible scourge to mankind and eliminate the danger of the spread of chemical weapons.

We are facing a situation similar to the late sixties and early seventies, when the spread of nuclear weapons was to be prevented through the nonproliferation treaty. Chemical weapons must not become the little man's atom bomb. [passage omitted]

INF Treaty Hailed

Genscher, Kohl Pleased

08241756 Hamburg DPA in German
1710 GMT 24 Nov 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Immediately after delivering a speech in the Bundestag today, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher underscored his "great satisfaction" at receiving the news of an agreement in Geneva on the [INF] Treaty. He is pleased with the agreement, not least because the elimination of medium-range missiles "is in the interest of Europeans and favors cohesion within the alliance."

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz will brief Genscher and the other NATO foreign ministers on the details of the treaty in Brussels tomorrow afternoon.

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl received the news of the agreement "with extraordinary satisfaction," government spokesman Friedhelm Ost said. That had secured the central point on the agenda of the Washington summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The

treaty is a historical breakthrough because it leads to real disarmament and opens the door to further steps of disarmament and arms control.

Ruehe Urges Further Steps

08250959 Hamburg DPA in German
0936 GMT 25 Nov 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The CDU/CSU Bundestag Group has welcomed the Soviet-U.S. agreement on a treaty to remove medium-range missiles, but at the same time demanded farther-reaching steps. Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the Bundestag Group, stated today in Bonn that the medium-range agreement could only be assessed as a first step along the road to balanced disarmament.

The issue of whether the agreed halving of strategic weapons would come about was decisive for the security of the Federal Republic and the Western alliance. Other yardsticks were the global removal of chemical weapons as well as disarmament in the conventional area. In his assessment Ruehe was of the opinion that the Federal Republic had, by its policies, made a significant contribution to the agreement now achieved.

Press Commentaries on Shultz-Shevardnadze Talks

17251355 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 25 Nov 87

[From the Press Review]

[Excerpts] Newspapers today comment on the INF agreement reached by Shultz and Shevardnadze in Geneva. [passage omitted] SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG points out the following: The President and the general secretary need the summit more than ever, and both need it for domestic policy reasons. Gorbachev's perestroika obviously has reached the limit of what his colleagues in the Politburo can tolerate, and Reagan has governed since Black Monday and the fall of the dollar under stricter control by Congress. In a predicament at home, the President and the general secretary, the leaders of the two rival superpowers, have become each other's best allies SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG believes. [passage omitted]

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE sees the situation as follows: The double-zero solution will change little about the superpowers' strategic situation nothing has changed about intercontinental missile deterrence, and the threat of mutually assured destruction will continue. What has changed, however, is the situation in Europe. NATO has one important option less. The Pershing-2's and the cruise missiles were the only weapons able to threaten the Soviet Union directly from European territory. When they are removed, an important step on the ladder of escalation will be missing. To that extent the Europeans' security has deteriorated, even though they have only said so in a low voice in recent weeks, stresses the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE commentator.

Genscher Comments on INF Agreement

17261111 Hamburg Norddeutscher Rundfunk Network in German 1600 GMT 25 Nov 87

["Excerpts" from interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Geneva by correspondent Hahn on the "Abendkurier" program, date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Genscher] Now we can say that we are on the right path and that we will achieve a treaty containing the absolute abolition of all medium-range missiles in the West and in the East.

[Hahn] In other words, the Soviet Union, having roughly 1,500 warheads, will clearly have to dismantle more than the NATO partners having about 350 warheads. So it will be a so-called asymmetric disarmament agreement.

[Genscher] It emphasizes the principle that he who has more weapons must disarm more. It is an important principle for other disarmament spheres in which the Soviet Union has a preponderance.

[Hahn] What will be necessary for the FRG with regard to verification, and how will the Bundestag handle it, for example?

[Genscher] We will have to ratify the part dealing with verification. That is correct and necessary. The FRG never left any doubt that it is prepared to accept every verification measure considered necessary. A really important step has been made here.

[Hahn] Will there be the danger now, after everybody is feeling relieved about the historical breakthrough, that we might be threatened by short-range weapons in a crisis?

[Genscher] That danger does not exist. What the foreign ministers decided in Reykjavik remains valid. We will confirm this once more when we meet here again in the near future. As we said in Reykjavik, we want to prepare our position for dealing with shorter-range missiles.

Kohl Sends Message to Gorbachev on Disarmament

08281449 Hamburg DPA in German 1352 GMT
28 Nov 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has spelled out Bonn's attitude on disarmament and arms control and commented on questions related to FRG-Soviet relations in another letter to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. This was announced by Government Spokesman Friedhelm Ost in Bonn today. Ost thus confirmed a TASS report stating that a message from Kohl had been handed over via the FRG Embassy in Moscow.

The chancellor was thus replying, a few days before the new U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, to a personal message from Gorbachev, which Soviet Central Committee Secretary Anatoliy Dobrynin conveyed in Bonn on 9 October.

Ruehe Deems Conventional Arms Accord 'Feasible'

08291151 Hamburg DPA in German
0902 GMT 29 Nov 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Volker Ruehe, deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, regards as feasible an agreement with the Soviet Union on conventional weapons within 2-3 years. He expects an agreement in the first half of next year on a start to such negotiations, Ruehe said in a talk with the Zurich SONNTAGS-ZEITUNG. There could then be a start next year to talks on disarmament between the Atlantic and Urals.

In his view, an increase in or modernization of short-range nuclear missiles is not on the agenda following the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. medium-range agreement. This also applies to the 88 "Lance" missiles in West Europe.

Gorbachev Welcomes Experts' Disarmament Proposal

08291501 Hamburg DPA in German
1409 GMT 29 Nov 87

[Text] Tutzing (DPA)—Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on Sunday welcomed the disarmament proposal made by security experts from four NATO countries which envisages joint upper levels for conventional armaments. According to Albrecht von Mueller, head of the security policy research project at the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, Gorbachev has written that the Warsaw Pact states are striving for a situation in which armies no longer have an offensive or invasion capability.

The disarmament initiative, Mueller said at the "Armies Without Weapons of Attack" meeting this weekend at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing, envisages a clear reduction in conventional armaments in the East and West. In the case of offensive weapon systems, joint upper limits for both military systems must be laid down. Between the Atlantic and the Urals, East and West should each have a maximum of 10,000 tanks, 2,000 combat aircraft and missiles with a limited range of 50 km, and in addition defensive weapons like antitank missiles in "whatever quantities wanted."

Mueller told DPA that Gorbachev's advisers had asked him to put the conventional disarmament initiative on paper from a Western viewpoint. Mueller and his counterparts from the United States, Great Britain, and Denmark had, however, acted as "private persona."

Brigadier Klaus Naumann from the Federal Defense Ministry regards as unrealistic the conclusion of a treaty on conventional arms within 5 years, as proposed by the Max Planck researchers. The Bundeswehr is already purely defensive. There is no inculcation of hostile concepts, plans or exercises containing plans of attack. He says he would be glad if the same could be said about the Eastern Bloc. It is fundamental that the Bundeswehr be able to "counterattack" in order to "restore deterrence."

Genscher Discusses Disarmament, Afghanistan

08011009 Hamburg DPA in German
0027 GMT 1 Dec 87

[Text] Stuttgart (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher hopes that after a treaty on the removal of medium-range missiles, an agreement will be reached on a reduction of conventional weapons. In an interview with the monthly periodical EVANGELISCHE KOMMENTARE Genscher said in reply to a question on whether the reduction in medium-range missiles would not be followed by arming in other areas: "It is decisive that we also start negotiations on conventional weapons. The Eastern side's superiority is proven beyond doubt. That must not remain the case. General Secretary Gorbachev has stated that in all areas where there are superiorities he wants to remove them." A year ago presumably no one would have believed that now the removal of medium-range weapons would be imminent. "A new thinking is becoming visible in this area, which demands imitation in all areas."

On the subject of Afghanistan, Genscher was of the opinion that the Soviet Government must realize that an end to the war there would be an important contribution to world peace. It must also recognize "that its policy will be mostly judged on whether it is prepared to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan without wanting to decide what the internal situation in the country will look like."

Woerner Says West Lacks Arms Control Concept

08050034 Hamburg DPA in German 1835 GMT 4 Dec 87

[Text] Oldenburg/Brussels (DPA)—In the view of Defense Minister Manfred Woerner the Western defense alliance is lacking a cohesive arms control concept that matches the West's security requirements. Woerner said in Oldenburg on Friday evening that only such a concept would enable NATO to react because it would "place us in the position of being able to see things in context." The minister, who is likely to take over the office of the NATO secretary general, countered at a news conference the view that the West is currently only reacting to disarmament proposals from Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev. All disarmament negotiations currently being conducted go back to proposals from the West, Woerner said.

The minister, who this evening addressed employers from the northwest of the Federal Republic, stressed the significance of European military development and procurement programs for the aerospace industry of Western Europe. Development contracts from the Armed Forces represent in the Federal Republic the basis for the aviation industry. Without them Airbus would have been inconceivable.

Press Comments on Washington Summit

17101317 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0605 GMT 10 Dec 87

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Today's main editorial issue again is the U.S.-SOVIET summit meeting in Washington.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE has the following to say: If the INF treaty may be taken to mean an initial step toward a possible improvement in East-West relations, it is not so much the elimination of a certain category of land-based missiles, but the agreement achieved on verification. For the first time a practicable procedure for carrying out on-site inspections in both countries has been initialled. It might play a pioneering role. The AMERICAN Senate will take a very close look at it.

The daily DIE WELT says: While some particular problems are being solved in Washington, the summit gives rise to a large number of others. The superpowers are trying to ease their burdens in Europe and Europe lacks sufficient weight and unity to have its interests included in a dialogue in which it does not participate. The time has come to convince Reagan of the need to hold a Western summit conference with a view to turning the collapsing Western strategy into a new and more coherent one.

The Duesseldorf-based RHEINISCHE POST observes: It is to be welcomed that the thoughts of the leading politicians both East and West now transcend the usual patterns of mutual nuclear deterrence and that they act accordingly. From the view of a divided Europe, however, the question arises, whether beyond these arms-related changes — as significant as they are — there will also be far-reaching improvements in East-West relations in the foreseeable future. After all, the danger that the unsatisfactory situation in Europe, characterized by the division of Berlin and Germany for instance, will go unchanged while the superpowers are reaching broad agreement, cannot simply be dismissed.

WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE, published in Essen, maintains: Gorbachev would not have come to Washington if the signing of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles had been the 'only' thing at stake there. His goal goes beyond the signing of that treaty. On the one hand, the Soviets want the continuation of the disarmament process. The number of long-range missiles is to be cut in half and weapons in space is at

least to be delayed. What is important for them on top of that, is negotiating international problems among the superpowers and thus officially to be put on an equal footing.

The Bonn General-Anzeiger notes: There are many indications that Gorbachev and Reagan are willing to postpone the SDI conflict in order to bestow upon themselves a new success in the disarmament process and the publicity of another signing ceremony at their next summit meeting in Moscow. It is not only the leaders of the two superpowers but the whole world that is longing for another breakthrough in disarmament. But recent U.S.-SOVIET summit history clearly reveals that there has to be more to it than good faith and the zest for detente. Possible setbacks have always to be taken into account and that is why a final success gives all the more reason to celebrate.

HESSISCHE/NIEDERSAECHSISCHE allgemeine, published in Kassel, comments: Military strategists have long anticipated the consequences of eliminating the missiles. It is all the more important for the disarmament process not to come to a standstill and instead be continued in other fields as well. What is on the agenda in Washington is reducing intercontinental missiles to half their present potential. Such a reduction is the most likely agreement to be put into practice, because it would in no way alter the military balance. For all our efforts, however, we must not be led to forget the imbalance in terms of conventional weapons and forces, because that is where the more immediate danger for Europe arises.

Kohl Speaks at 10 Dec Bundestag Debate

17101001 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 0805 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Statement by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the Bundestag in Bonn—live—DW]

[Text] Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen: the Summit meeting between president Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev is ending in Washington today. That meeting will go down in history because it has produced the first real disarmament agreement. Based on the INF agreement signed on 8 December 1987, all U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear intermediate-range missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km will be abolished worldwide. Thus the security of millions of people, in particular in Europe, will be improved.

That day, 8 December, also marks a great success for the Atlantic alliance, which has worked toward such an agreement since the 1979 NATO two-track decision. [applause] The threat to Europe posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles will end. Some 108 Pershing-2 missiles and 46 cruise missiles will be removed from FRG territory. In addition, the alliance will discontinue the current deployment of cruise missiles.

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen: The agreement is of basic importance for the disarmament process because it removes an entire weapons category and because it envisages highly asymmetric reductions and a comprehensive verification system, including checks upon suspicion. Many people did not believe that such a result would be possible at all, and we often discussed that here in the Bundestag. Many people helped achieve that great success, in particular, U.S. President Ronald Reagan. [Applause] He has often been criticized, including by us, but we have every reason to thank him cordially today. General Secretary Gorbachev should also be given credit for having cleared the way for compromise and a good result. [Applause]

The alliance's solidarity was a basic prerequisite for that success. The United States has continuously consulted its partners on all important negotiation issues in a trusting way. The alliance partners for their part have backed the United States at crucial stages of the negotiations, thereby contributing to the result that has now been achieved.

However, the history of that success also includes the fact that the alliance had to deploy intermediate-range missiles and cruise missiles before really serious negotiations were started in Geneva. At the time, we did not find it easy to take such a step. The opposition then urged us to reject the NATO two-track decision and thus breach the agreement. It was ready to accept the threat posed to our country by the SS-20 missiles. We rejected that and carried out the NATO two-track decision.

Ladies and gentlemen, I understand very well why you are restive at this point, because today the hour of truth has come for you. [applause] The result that was achieved in Washington was only possible because we resisted your defamations and wrong predictions. [applause] The FRG's history knows but a few examples of trading in people's anxieties in such a miserable way. [applause]

Let me remind you and let me point out how much it hurt us that from this rostrum we, the CDU/CSU, were told that we were incapable of peace. [commotion] Mr Apel, I will cite some more recent examples. You should not make any interjection because you were among those insisting on the issue of war and warmongering. [applause, shouts] Mr Bahr said on 22 December: we will have to pay for the decisions made by the Bundestag majority, including in our relations with the East. Mr Bahr added: The Federal Government is wrong; the negotiations should be easier following deployment. The Russians should be more compromising following deployment. The contrary is correct. I think, our colleague Bahr should say here that he was wrong. That is possible, but it is true. [applause]

Deputy Vogel, you said at the SPD congress in Essen in May 1984 that it is deliberately misleading for the Federal Government to claim that the beginning of

deployment has improved security and enhanced the readiness for understanding, whereas it is very obvious that the arms race is accelerating and tensions between the two powers have intensified since November last year. Deputy Vogel, you were wrong (applause), and by creating fears of war you misled the German public. That is our experience. [applause, shouts]

When the superpower negotiations were resumed in March 1985 the Federal Government brought all its political importance to bear on the Western camp and on the Soviet Union in an effort to achieve the removal of those superpower intermediate-range nuclear systems by way of negotiations. The Federal Government's course and policy have been logical and clear, and the successes of our policy are obvious to everyone today. With that policy we have made peace for our people more secure. [applause]

Our policy has always been predictable and therefore successful. By the way, our policy is an excellent confirmation of the alliance's Harmel concept in East-West relations.

Deputy Vogel, on a day like today you should be silent because you were one of the false prophets. [applause, shouts] For the sake of some partisan advantage and out of power policy considerations, you jeopardized the country's security. [applause, shouts]

On the basis of a secure defense capacity and deterrence, we worked hard for a negotiated solution. We were always confident that it is only possible to achieve results in disarmament negotiations if all other areas of East-West cooperation are included. The Federal Government has made substantial contributions to achieving that agreement. That has been recognized all over the world.

Foreign Minister Genscher Speaks at Bundestag Debate

*17101351 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German
1113 GMT 10 Dec 87*

[speech by Foreign Minister Hans-dietrich Genscher at the Bundestag in Bonn—Live—DW]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Service in the Bundeswehr is service for peace. Our soldiers' mission is not attacking other countries or waging wars. Their mission is simple and clear—doing military service so as to preserve peace. And, ladies and gentlemen, soldiers are our brothers just like conscientious objectors. Both deserve our respect, and we will not allow either to be defamed. [applause]

Ladies and gentlemen, we will achieve our objective lastingly to ensure peace only if we analyze developments honestly. That means that firmness and negotiating readiness, defense and readiness for disarmament are necessary. Above all, our foreign and security policy has to be steady, predictable, and continuous. In addition,

we have to realize that our alliance's indispensable cohesion has to prove its worth not only in defense, but also in disarmament policy. NATO is not a community marked by an arms buildup, but a security community marked by an arms buildup, but a security community marked by values, with disarmament and arms control being integral component parts of its policy.

A prerequisite for the INF agreement was a basic change in the Soviet position on disarmament and East-West relations. A change of thinking was also necessary in the West. President Reagan has impressively done so, and we have to thank him for that. The new way of thinking at the Reykjavik meeting, which had initially been underestimated and even criticized, and the realization that security in the nuclear age requires cooperation—not confrontation—have cleared the way. As to the fact that Gorbachev was finally ready to agree to the total removal of all intermediate-range missiles worldwide, which the West had urged in vain for so very long and the Soviet Union had rejected equally persistently, he let his words be followed by deeds, at least on that crucial issue.

It is important for us Europeans that the double-zero solution remove the threat of an entire weapons category. It creates more,—not less—security. It is equally important for both superpowers not to stop at that, but to reduce the strategic weapons threatening us equally by an initial 50 percent.

Ladies and gentlemen, the overall concept of our disarmament policy also includes an equally urgent measure—the removal of chemical weapons worldwide, the creation of conventional stability through balance and through the elimination of the capability to invade, as well as a mandate regarding short-range nuclear weapons as an element of a Western overall disarmament concept.

The NATO foreign ministers Reykjavik concept has to be developed and adjusted to changing conditions. However, the indisputable necessity to continue that concept should not prevent us from taking the steps that are necessary today. The decisive intellectual breakthrough of the agreement on the double-zero solution consists of the realization that more weapons do not create more security, and that the 4 May, 1983 government statement—create peace with fewer weapons—is justified.

Weapons are being removed by the free decision of those who possess them, not as a consequence of victory of one side over the other. That is the new element these days. [applause] That decision requires wisdom, responsibility, firmness, and strong will to prevail against the old way of thinking that still exists everywhere. We will continue to need such responsibility and firmness in the future.

Ladies and gentlemen: Not just defense, but disarmament requires the ability to assert and be firm. Disarmament quite definitely requires a new way of thinking that

alone has made it possible not only to halt the arms spiral but turn it back. That victory of common sense is also reason for hope. But that hope will only materialize if the same spirit also inspires all the other disarmament negotiations, and if we can implement two basic breakthroughs in intermediate-range missiles—asymmetric disarmament aimed at removing superiority, and effective verification, including on-site inspections, to overcome suspicion.

Disarmament policy as an essential part of our war-preventing strategy requires us to think about the long term. That means first of all that we have to take the principle seriously that the East and West accept the idea that if one side is superior it is its duty to reduce such superiority, and not the inferior's duty to catch up. The side that is superior has the greater responsibility. The direct road to disarmament is the better way. Those who have more weapons have to disarm more. The realization that the superior side has to disarm must prove its worth, if the task—according to NATO's Reykjavik statement—is reducing Soviet short-range superiority by negotiations on equal upper limits.

That is the way that leads to balance. You are right, Colleague Ruehe, that is why modernization cannot be on the agenda. [applause] It is equally important consistently to keep in mind that nuclear weapons have to fulfill a political function. Obscuring the qualitative differences between nuclear and conventional weapons may easily pave the precipitous way to war-waging scenarios and thus to the possibility of war.

Editorials Analyze Washington Summit Results
*17111101 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in
German 0605 GMT 11 Dec 87*

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Today's editorials analyze the U.S.-SOVIET summit meeting in Washington.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE writes: The current arms control policy has come to an end with the signing of the INF agreement on the worldwide dismantling of intermediate-range weapons. Reagan and Gorbachev have achieved a breakthrough in that, for the first time since the beginning of the nuclear age, they succeeded in decreasing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. However, the only weapons involved are those the two big powers do not need for the defense of their national territory. The Soviet Union is relieved at the forthcoming elimination of the U.S. Pershing II missiles that are deployed in West Europe, particularly on FRG territory, as a significant element of deterrence. Compared with the current means to prevent arms control violations, the agreed-upon INF verification stipulations are sensational. Both sides will have a look at military installations that have heretofore been jealously protected. Confidence could develop that could bring positive influence to bear on ensuing negotiations.

WESTDEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, published in Essen, notes: A significant aspect of summit conferences is the private talks of the big two. They served the purpose of becoming better acquainted. The statesmen wanted to talk frankly, unobserved by their ministers and experts. That is supposed to facilitate future cooperation. Such talks create the desired impression that the top government chiefs are making serious efforts. We know roughly from later reports of participants in earlier summit talks, and also on the current one, what is involved. Conditions within their own spheres of influence and power are discussed together with intentions and limits to be observed. The building of the Berlin Wall was a classic example. The Americans knew that there was no aggressive intention behind it, and the Soviets knew how far they could go and what limits they had to respect. An exchange of opinion on such explosive issues is undoubtedly useful.

NEUE RUHR-ZEITUNG, also published in Essen, maintains: Time and patience are the best advisers, Reagan said as he and Gorbachev signed the treaty on scrapping a whole category of nuclear weapons. Time, patience, and also courage and determination will be necessary to continue on the path that has led to the Washington summit success. There is worldwide agreement on the superpowers arrangement, but future resistance will not be negligible. That is true of the weapons industry, which has become accustomed to multibillion orders, as well as to the entire balance of power strategy, on which the questionable security of the world is based.

WESTFAELISCHE NACHRICHTEN, published in Muenster, states: The task that is facing the Americans and the Soviets, the solution to which the first step has been taken, is enormous. If 6 years of intense negotiations were necessary to achieve that interim victory, how much time will be necessary to reach the end of the missile labyrinth? If the first agreement is not to be patchwork, Reagan and Gorbachev must face the next challenge today. Both of them have shown their ability to learn. Reagan has learned that even as an anti-communist incarnate you have to negotiate with the evil empire if you want results. His strategy of negotiating from a position of strength has overcome the Soviet Union's hesitation and resistance in the end. However, that success was only possible because Gorbachev's secret of success was flexibility. On that basis, further negotiations would be possible if world history continued purposefully on a straight line.

The following quotation comes from SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: Before meeting Gorbachev, Reagan said that Gorbachev achieved changes in the Soviet Union, that are characterized by more freedom of opinion under glasnost, and the release of political prisoners. However, the Washington negotiations showed that the party chief's leeway in matters of human rights is narrow. Those who had overlooked it were reminded by the Moscow police action. The question remains who

wanted to trip Gorbachev by disavowing glasnost in such a tsirking way. Gorbachev has made concessions in this matter to Reagan hardly going beyond the framework of humanitarian action.

KIELER NACHRICHTEN comes to the following conclusion: The U.S.-SOVIET summit that ended last night in Washington will go down in history as the disarmament summit, in contrast to the flop at Reykjavik. That issue was the main topic of the meeting that lasted several days. Obvious results were achieved by Ronald Reagan's and Mikhail Gorbachev's signatures on the disarmament agreement for intermediate-range missiles. That is a success. Further verification and mutual measures have been agreed upon or discussed—such as instructions for the Geneva negotiations on the long-range nuclear missiles. Those are also successes—news that creates hope for the future and for the next summit meeting in Moscow. However, in the end it is better to seal one matter—in this case disarmament—and get it going, than to try too many summit meetings in a short time. The tour d'horizon of world issues can be a reason to determine common standpoints and common actions to preserve world peace, particularly with a view to the gulf war.

Dregger Calls for Further Nuclear Disarmament
08211103 Hamburg DPA in German
1032 GMT 21 Dec 87

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—CDU/CSU Group Chairman Alfred Dregger has called on the United States and Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear intercontinental missiles, not just by half but even further. In a newspaper article ("EXPRESS", Cologne) published by the CDU/CSU in Bonn on Monday, Dregger thus countered the present plans for strategic nuclear systems. "Washington and Moscow should reduce their intercontinental missiles to a number which corresponds to the total number of the arsenals of the two European nuclear powers—Great Britain and France," Dregger said. This would be sufficient for deterrence and reduce substantially the destructive nuclear potential. The CDU politician once again called for an overall concept by NATO for disarmament and advocated again the total elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe.

GREECE

Papandreou Sees 'Huge Significance' in INF Pact
10092057 Athens Domestic Service in Greek
1930 GMT 9 Dec 87

[Statement by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in Athens; date not given—recorded]

[Text] Undoubtedly, yesterday, 8 December 1987, possibly constitutes the most important achievement, the most important piece of news since the end of World War II. On this occasion, the two great nuclear powers did not sign an agreement to limit the rate of increase of

some types of weapons. Instead, in this instance, the SS-20's have been withdrawn from the East and the Pershing II's and the cruise missiles have been withdrawn from the West. These not only have been withdrawn, but they will be destroyed. This is an event of huge significance. This is a historic turn toward peace.

Undoubtedly, we feel obligated both to Reagan and Gorbachev for the success of this initiative. However, I would first like to stress that this point is not the end, but the beginning of a new chapter. There are other weapons of greater destruction: the strategic weapons, the future militarization of outer space, the chemical weapons, the nuclear weapons of very short range. It is clear that all humanity, as it celebrates this great achievement today, simultaneously hopes that the settlement of the other issues will proceed expeditiously.

We should stress that the peace movements all over the world should be considered vindicated today. There have been many who believed that denuclearization was a utopia; today it is a reality. There is a start in this direction. As a member of the Initiative of the Six, I would also like to reiterate that our efforts will continue. We shall meet in Stockholm in January to promote with the same zest the effort to further reduce nuclear weapons and to realize their ultimate eradication from the face of the earth.

I believe that the citizens of this world should truly feel today that their lives and those of their children, the future of humanity, have begun to be safeguarded by those who have the power to bring disaster. Instead, they can — and we hope they will — bring peace.

ITALY

Government 'Fully Supports' INF Accord
08252341 Rome Domestic Service in Italian
2130 GMT 25 Nov 87

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State Shultz has outlined at NATO Headquarters the Euromissile agreement reached in Geneva with Shevardnadze. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Andreotti who, on his return to Rome, reported to the prime minister. The Chigi Palace then issued a communique saying that the Italian Government fully supports the agreement on Euromissiles and hopes that it will be signed in Washington and promptly ratified by the U.S. Congress.

Bonalumi Meets with Soviet Envoy Grinevskiy on Summit
02181224 Rome ANSA in English
1028 GMT 18 Dec 87

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, December 18—Italian Foreign Undersecretary Gilberto Bonalumi met here with special Soviet envoy Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy, who came

to the Italian capital to illustrate Moscow's point of view on the recent Washington summit between American President Ronald Reagan and Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

During their talks, Ambassador Grinevskiy particularly underlined the importance of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the superpower leaders, December 8, affirming that it was the first step towards other disarmament agreements including one to eliminate long-range intercontinental nuclear missiles, an accord he said "progress" was made on during the December 8-10 summit.

The INF treaty calls for the elimination of all short and medium-range nuclear missiles in and aimed at Europe. It is the first US-Soviet treaty that eliminates a whole category of missiles rather than just limiting their proliferation.

On his part, the Italian foreign undersecretary expressed the Italian Government's complete satisfaction for the INF treaty and underlined the necessity to achieve a new, reduced balance in conventional arms and the total ban of chemical weapons.

Ambassador Grinevskiy, accompanied by Moscow's ambassador to Rome, Nikolay Lunkov, also met yesterday with Italian head-of-state Francesco Cossiga to whom he illustrated the Kremlin's position on disarmament and East-West relations. Cossiga, on his part, renewed his invitation to Gorbachev to visit Italy soon.

NETHERLANDS

Opposition to Dutch Missile Base Construction
13120911 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch
2 Nov 87 p 1

[Unnamed own correspondent report: "Second Chamber Opposition to Completing Woensdrecht Construction Program Growing"]

[Excerpt] The Hague—The opposition in the Second Chamber to completion of the construction program at the Woensdrecht missile base is growing. Now that it is clear that an INF treaty for the withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe will be signed 7 December, even Christian Democratic Appeal voices are being raised in opposition to further construction work. According to Christian Democratic Appeal spokesman Frinking it is now "not so terribly urgent" that further work be carried out at the missile base after the signing of the INF agreement by President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev.

In his view the Netherlands Government must make it clear in its consultations with its NATO partners "that it is pointless to complete Woensdrecht as a missile base." Before further construction work can take place, it must first be established what the base's future function will

be, Frinking said. The cabinet takes the view that after the signing of the INF treaty talks about the future of Woensdrecht can take place.

A Defense Ministry spokesman announced Saturday [31 October] that the cabinet will probably inform the Second Chamber in a letter in the latter half of December of what will happen to the base. By then consultations with the other members of NATO will have taken place. Last week Defense Minister van Eekelen told Second Chamber members in a written reply that the operational section of the missile base is as good as ready, and can be taken into service from 1 January. [Passage omitted]

PORTUGAL

Government Satisfied With INF Treaty Signing

Council of Ministers Meeting

08102105 Lisbon International Service in Portuguese
1900 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Text] The Portuguese Government has expressed its satisfaction at the agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe, which was signed on Tuesday by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The government's position was expressed at the end of a meeting of the Council of Ministers by the minister of the presidency, who affirmed government [word indistinct] in the pursuit of disarmament in Europe and the abolition of chemical weapons.

Cavaco Silva Briefing for Soares

08102310 Lisbon Domestic Service in Portuguese
2200 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Excerpt] Portugal should be pleased at the agreement between the superpowers in Washington not only as a NATO member, but also because from now on our territory will be out of the range of Soviet SS-20 missiles, Cavaco Silva said.

The prime minister met the president for 3 hours for an overall analysis of internal and foreign policy. The head of the government informed Mario Soares of (?reforms) for Portuguese society which the government is implementing. The prime minister also briefed the president about the government's official position on the agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles which was signed in Washington. Cavaco Silva commented that it was quite a positive step. However, he said, the allies should continue to insist on a reduction of conventional weapons and intercontinental missiles, as well as the issue of human rights. [passage omitted]

TURKEY

Halefoglul: INF Treaty 'Step in Right Direction'

15102033 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish
1700 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Excerpts] Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglul has said that Turkey supports the INF agreement signed between Reagan and Gorbachev and views it as a significant step towards disarmament. He made this statement in Brussels, where he is to attend the NATO Ministerial Council meetings. Halefoglul also met with Claude Cheysson, EEC official responsible for Mediterranean affairs. Turkish Radio and Television correspondent Oca Onal reports from Brussels:

[Begin Onal recording] [Passage omitted] In a statement after meeting Cheysson, Halefoglul commented on the NATO Ministerial Council meeting to begin in Brussels tomorrow. He said that Turkey has supported the INF agreement from the beginning and views it as a step in the right direction. Noting that the INF agreement will not be sufficient on its own, the foreign minister stressed that strategic weapons must also be limited and the imbalance in conventional arms must be eliminated. Halefoglul added that the human rights issue will also be discussed at the NATO Ministerial Council meeting. The oppression of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria will be raised within this framework, he noted.

Ozal Comments on Foreign Policy, INF Agreement

15101903 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish
1700 GMT 10 Dec 87

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In a statement in Houston, United States, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal assessed recent developments in Turkish foreign policy and the INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

[Begin Ozal recording] During our government's term in office, Turkish foreign policy was based on sustained good relations with our neighbors and with the world, as well as on the principle of detente. We (?implemented) Turkey's foreign policy as an active policy.

Currently, we carry weight in the Middle East. I have been told this by everyone both here and elsewhere. I would like to state clearly that Turkey is actually being consulted on matters concerning the Iran-Iraq war and the Middle East.

When we came to power, we started [our initiatives] with Greece under very difficult conditions. For a long time we received no response. After the latest Aegean crisis, however, we began observing a change in this area. I believe that the exchange of messages will lead to a meeting, but I cannot be definite about the venue or the date.

In the face of the terror of a nuclear war, the reduction and even elimination of nuclear weapons can easily be accepted by large masses in the world without considering other options and without thinking that in a way nuclear weapons even prevent wars. Therefore, I believe that the signing of the INF agreement is supported by the people in Europe, America, and even the socialist countries.

Naturally, this agreement comprises only a very small portion of all nuclear weapons. As we saw here today, this is only the tip of a big iceberg. I hope that this will lead to wider-ranging agreements. This, of course, is not the end; in addition to nuclear weapons, there is also chemical, biological, as well as conventional warfare. The Eastern bloc in general has significant superiority over the West in conventional armaments. From this viewpoint, Turkey is located in a very critical region. I

think that Turkey's role in the defense of Europe will gain greater importance in the coming period. The importance of conventional weapons will increase with the reduction of nuclear weapons. Time will show whether there will be a reduction in this field, or whether this issue will be handled before settling the nuclear and chemical weapons, or whether they will be dealt with simultaneously. It is difficult to predict.

In the final assessment, this agreement appears to be a good one. I hope that the opportunity to reach wider-ranging agreements will be created in the next few years, so that resources channeled to armaments can be used to provide greater prosperity for the nations and eliminate poverty and hunger. This should be the real objective behind all these agreements. [end recording]

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